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CERTAIN ILLUSIONS ABOUT SPEECH:
WHY THE FREE-SPEECH CRITIQUE OF
HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT
HARASSMENT IS WRONG
Miranda Oshige McGowan*
Can antidiscrimination laws punish hostile work environment harassment without infringing freedom of speech and expression? Consider the following examples of nude pictures displayed in different workplaces.
Joan is the only woman welder at a shipyard. Her coworkers
have posted sexually explicit centerfolds, calendars, and cartoon
depictions of nude women from Playboy, Hustler, and similar
magazines throughout common areas-the break room, the
cafeteria, the halls, and the equipment room.' Some of the posters could be construed as political statements about the proper
role of women: In one of the photos, a woman wears just an
apron; in another, a woman wears a skimpy nurse's outfit. The
pictures unnerve Joan, and she asks her supervisors to have the
pictures removed. They tell her she's nuts if she thinks men in a
shipyard will take down their girlie pictures. Get used to it, they
tell her. She sues, alleging that the pictures have created a sexually hostile work environment.
The Museum of Modern Art is running an exhibition on
"Playboy: Transforming the Body in American Society," which
features enlarged versions of Playboy centerfolds to document
changes in American visions of female beauty. A woman security guard objects to being assigned to the gallery in which this
exhibition is being held. MoMA refuses to reassign her, and she
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. Thanks to
the participants in the University of Minnesota Law School Works-In-Progress series for
helpful comments, criticisms, and questions. Special thanks to Robert Post for early inspiration and encouragement, to Dan Farber for too many helpful and interesting conversations to count, to Jim Chen for helpful and insightful comments, and to David
McGowan for all the above and more.
I. Cf. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
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sues, alleging that the pictures have created a hostile work environment.
Librarians have sued the Minneapolis Public Library for
failing to correct a hostile work environment. The librarians
claim that male patrons have been using the library's Internet
kiosks to surf pornography sites. The librarians can see the computer screens from the reference desk. At least once a day, they
see raunchy pictures of various sex acts (and those are the tame
ones). Often, the patrons use the library's color printers to print
these pictures, but then forget to retrieve them. When the librarians clean out old print jobs, they see these images. The librarians must also enforce time limits on Internet use; sometimes patrons will react aggressively when the librarians ask
them to relinquish a computer. One patron yelled at a librarian,
and another threw a chair across the room after being asked to
sign off. The librarians have complained to the directors of the
library. The library directors have been unwilling to install
Internet filters, claiming that the First Amendment prevents
them from doing so. Disgusted, the librarians have filed a complaint with the EEOC.
In each of these examples, the meaning of the expression
changes in each of the three workplaces- though the surface
content of the depictions is the same. These examples suggest
that our reaction to whether expression should properly form
the basis of a harassment claim has less to do with what is said or
displayed than with the context in which the words are uttered
or the images are displayed. I advance that thesis here.
Part I argues that the First Amendment status of expression
in the workplace is determined by context, not by bright-line
rules. Workplaces have varying missions, and a workplace's mission affects how workers encounter expression. The social benefits of expression and the social costs of regulating it are also affected by a workplace's mission.
Some workplaces are organized primarily to make money
by designing, making, or selling a product or providing some service. Any expressive aspects of the product or service (the
Volkswagen Bug's evocation of nostalgia) are directed towards
something other than thought, deliberation, or debate among
consumers of the product or service. A few examples would be
food, clothing, or car retailers, manufacturers, pharmaceutical
companies, construction companies, and accounting firms.
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Other workplaces have a communicative or expressive mission. They are organized around the purpose of communicating
an idea or message, sparking conversation, argument, or thought
among patrons, or providing a place for patrons to engage in
conversation. A "communicative workplace," in other words,
produces or supports the production of expression that is itself
ordinarii¥ protected bi' the First Amendment. Museums and art
galleries, newspapers and magazines,4 and concert halls5 would
all be communicative workplaces. In Part I, I argue that some
expression in communicative workplaces may merit different
treatment under the First Amendment because it contributes to
public discourse.
All workplaces do some business through expression that
does not implicate First Amendment values, and communicative
workplaces are no exception. These non-discursive aspects of all
workplaces explain why no employer-not a museum, not a
newspaper 6 -could claim First Amendment protection against
an employee's breach of contract suit. These aspects of all businesses also explain why a museum guard suing for harassment
over pornography in the employees' lunchroom should be
treated differently from a guard who sues over the same pictures
displayed in the museum gallery as part of an exhibit.
Generally, harassment claims arising out of direct communications between supervisors and subordinates pose little if any
First Amendment problem, whether they arise in communicative
or ordinary workplaces. The same is true for harassment claims
based on direct interactions among coworkers. Environmental
harassment claims or claims based on harassment by a business's
customers may engender greater First Amendment worries
when the customers are engaging in or responding to First
Amendment activities within the realm of public discourse. The
First Amendment would (and should) prohibit a museum employee's hostile work environment suit based on patrons' tasteless comments about an exhibit. Within the realm of public discourse, the First Amendment requires government regulations
2. See, e.g., Brooklyn Inst. of Arts & Scis. v. City of New York, 64 F. Supp. 2d 184,
197-99 (E.D. N.Y. 1999).
3. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
4. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46,56 (1c;88).
5. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 789·90 (1989) (subjecting vol·
ume limits on a concert to First Amendment scrutiny).
6. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663,665 (1991) (holding that the First
Amendment did not exempt a newspaper from liability under generally applicable laws
for breach of contract).
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on expression to be neutral about substantive issues, including
race and sex equality. Within ordinary workplaces, however, the
law should strike a different balance between expression and
equality. Most employee speech within ordinary workplaces has
only a marginal relationship to public discourse. The government's interest in ensuring equal opportunity in ordinary workplaces generally outweighs employees' interests in engaging in
unfettered debate at work.
My contextual approach is open to the criticism that allowing First Amendment protection to hinge on something as
amorphous as "contextual meaning" could discourage a good
deal of speech because people fear coming too close to the line
between protected and punishable speech. Part II will refute the
"chill" argument. The First Amendment is just not about brightline rules. Bright-line rules play an important role only with regard to a tiny amount of expression and their importance is
overstated even there. Courts routinely deploy "reasonable person" standards and analyze the meaning of statements in context
in defamation and other dignitary tort cases-even when unquestionably political, nationally published speech is at issue.
Hostile environment's standards closely resemble those of other
dignitary torts. Moreover, the chill argument assumes that all
employers have the same incentives to avoid hostile work environment liability by stifling potentially offensive speech by employees and customers. This assumption is overly simplistic. Organizations that participate in, promote, or support public
discourse have few incentives to adopt policies unfriendly to
speech.
I. HOW DOES WORKPLACE CONTEXT AFFECT THE
CHARACTER OF "SPEECH" UNDER THE FIRST
AMENDMENT?

"Speech" in the First Amendment context is a term of art
that has both a broader and narrower meaning than when used
conversationally. 7 It is broader because it encompasses more
than verbal conduct. Pictures and symbols, not just words, are
protected, 8 as well as some expressi~e conduct such as the wearing of an armband and flag burning.
7. Frederick Schauer, The Speech-ing of Sexual Harassment, in MacKinnon and
Siegel, eds., Directions in Sexual Harassment Law at 547-48 (2003) (forthcoming) (manuscript on file with author).
8. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) ("The First Amendment literally
forbids the abridgment only of 'speech,' but we have long recognized that its protection
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"Speech" also has a narrower meaning than it does in ordinary usage. 10 Words used to contract fall within the category of
"verbal actions" known as "performatives." Performatives are
utterances or writings that do not describe, report, or assert
something and are not falsifiable. The words are part of some action that itself would not be described as "saying" something. 11
Speech is a performative when to say something is to do something beyond the act of uttering the words themselves. 12 Other
such examples of verbal actions include the vow to marry and a
will that bequeaths an estate. The First Amendment protects
none of these verbal "actions."
The range of utterances, writings, and depictions that the
government may freely regulate is not limited to performatives.
We often perceive regulable utterances, writings, and depictions
as action rather than as speech, much in the same way that we
see performatives as doing, not merely saying, something. Incitement, graffiti on private property, and product warning and
content labels, are all examples of this sort of non-performative
but regulable utterance. 13 Indeed, First Amendment speech
could be characterized as the exception to the more general rule
that "linguistic behavior-speech in the ordinary language
sense-is subject to control on the same standards as is any other
behavior." 14 At the very least, "for a vast range of verbal, linguistic, or pictorial conduct" the First Amendment is just not "part
of the picture." 15
does not end at the spoken or written word."); American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), affd 475 U.S. 1001 (1986) (recognizing generally that
nonverbal expression, such as pornographic pictures, is protected by the First Amendment).
9. Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969) (stating that
wearing an armband is speech); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (stating that !lag
burning is speech).
10. Kent Greenawalt, Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language 58 (Oxford U.
Press, 1989) ( stating that "situation-altering" utterances like agreements, promises, orders, and manipulative threats "are outside the scope of a principle of free speech," because they "are ways of doing things, not of asserting things, and they are generally subject to regulation on the same bases as most noncommunicative behavior"); Schauer,
Speech-ing at 2 (cited in note 7) (explaining "the domain of application of the First
Amendment ... is not coextensive with the forms of behavior that would count as
'speech' in ordinary non-technical English").
II. J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words 6, 12-13 (Harvard U. Press, 1962).
12. ld. at 12-13.
13. Sec Schauer, Speech-ing at 4 (cited in note 7).
14. !d. at 5 (footnote omitted).
15. ld. at 605; see also Robert Post, Sexual Harassment and the First Amendment, in
MacKinnon and Siegel, eds., Directions in Sexual Harassment Law 3 (2002) (forthcoming) (noting that "the First Amendment does not even attempt to protect all of the
'communication' that occurs through the explicit usc of words and language").
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A. WORK'S INEVITABLE ECONOMIC SPHERE

All employment relations involve some expression that
does not and should not receive First Amendment scrutiny. Employment contracts, disclosures of safety conditions, and unionmanagement interactions are all highly regulated. But regulations of these utterances and writings at work do not strike us as
regulations of "speech," because, in each case, the speech being
regulated is instrumental to accomplishing some end that is not
itself protected by the First Amendment.
When we speak of workplace harassment, we easily forget
that the cause of action arises from more general employment
discrimination statutes that regulate an economic relationship
between employers and employees. Title VII, the ADA, the
ADEA, and parallel state laws prohibit employers from making
employment decisions based on race, sex, national origin, color,
religion, disability, and age. They also prohibit employers from
using these characteristics to impose discriminatory terms and
conditions of employment or to segregate workplaces. These
laws require, in other words, that an employer ignore characteristics that he personally might find highly salient, so long as the
employee is the "best qualified" worker.
All workplaces share an important characteristic. All are instrumental organizations; that is, they are created and operated
to achieve some goal. Of course, different workplaces are constituted to achieve different goals. This point is obvious: workers at
the St. Paul Ford Explorer plant are organized to make SUVs,
and they combine their energies to make these behemoths.
Other organizations are defined by an ideological mission or
message. The organization's ideological mission or message,
however, does not change the fact that it is also an instrumental
organization. 16 The League of Women Voters, for example,
dedicates itself to promoting voting, regardless of a voter's affiliation. The League avoids partisan activities, and it encourages
its members to provide fora for debates among candidates of all
parties. The National Abortion Rights Action League is quite
similar. It hires people to solicit funds to support abortion rights,
and it pays lobbyists to voice particular positions about certain
state and federal initiatives. NARAL would certainly fire a canvasser who toed a pro-life line when soliciting funds or a lobbyist
16. See Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and
Theory of the Public Forum, 34 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1713, 1768-70 (1987) (explaining how
speech in workplaces is organized toward a specific end).
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who encouraged members of Congress to support legislation
that limited abortions.
Work's instrumental nature pervades interactions among
coworkers, supervisors, and subordinates, whether a workplace's
mission is like NARAL's or is oriented toward producing a good
or service outside of the First Amendment's ambit. The inevitable instrumental aspects of work, along with the responsibility to
get work done, color how we interpret events in the workplace.
Were we to come across a commode in the hallway of our workplace, we would suppose a plumber had forgotten to finish fixing
the restroom. In the gallery of a museum, we would see the same
commode as "art." 17 If an employer calls a meeting to speculate
about the dire effects of proposed unionization, the employer's
remarks seem more threatening 18 than if the employer speculates on The News Hour.
The Court has often countenanced federal regulation of
both employer and employee speech in the labor context and restrictions on expression in government workplaces. These decisions demonstrate two points. First, at least some expression in
all workplaces lies beyond the First Amendment, because the
expression accomplishes some end that does not implicate First
Amendment values. Second, workplace expression has an economic cost, and the government may legitimately regulate expression in the workplace to prevent economic disruption. Both
of these points affect whether the First Amendment permits
government to impose liability on employers for hostile work
environment harassment.
Discriminatory workplace harassment harms its targets
economically. Harassment increases the cost of work by subjecting "members of one [group] ... to disadvantageous terms or
conditions of employment," 1 thus making "it more difficult" for
members of that group "to do the job. "20 In this respect, harass17. See Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 Stan. L. Rev.
1249, 1253-54 (1995). Post argues that the Duehamp urinal is transformed from bathroom
appliance to art entitled "The Fountain," "because artists and spectators share conventions that establish the medium of art exhibitions, and these conventions can by themselves generate forms of human interaction that are acknowledged as 'ideas' within the
jurisprudence of the First Amendment." This is true for museum workers, too. The
commode in the back hallway is an accident or obstruction. The commode in the gallery
IS art. Though we can argue whether it is really "art," that fact itself perhaps proves it is.
18. See NLRB v. Gisse/ Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 616-19 (1969) (upholding the
NLRB's restrictions on an employer's comments about the potential harms of unionization as consistent with the First Amendment).
19. Oncale v. Sundvwner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
20. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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ment law's restrictions on workplace expression resemble other
regulations of workplace expression that are designed to prevent
or limit economic disruption. 21 That the cost of harassment is
caused by expression may matter in some cases. By itself, however, the fact that expression causes the economic harm does not
imply First Amendment protection for that expression any more
than does a scam artist's fraudulent pitch.
B. WHY ISN'T QUID PRO QUO HARASSMENT PROTECTED
SPEECH?

Title VII and other antidiscrimination laws generally punish
two types of workplace harassment. The first is quid pro quo
harassment, in which a supervisor (or someone with similar
powers) explicitly or implicitly threatens to fire an employee or
withhold some job benefit if the employee does not consent to
sexual conduct, and the supervisor carries out that threat (either
by withholding some job benefit or by exacting acquiescence to
sexual demands). 22
The second is hostile work environment harassment. Hostile work environment harassment does not involve threats carried out, implicit or otherwise. It occurs when-through conduct
or speech-a supervisor, coworker, or a third party (such as a
client of the employer) harasses another because of a prohibited
characteristic. 23 The harassment has to be severe enough to "alter the terms or conditions" of the victim's work environment. 24
A plaintiff can, in some cases, claim that she is subjected to a
hostile work environment even when she is not insulted or demeaned directly, if the work environment is permeated with insulting or demeaning gender- or race-based conduct or expression.
21. Of course it is wrong to say that the government can, consistent with the First
Amendment, pass a law that requires employers to restrict their employees' expression
just because the government, acting as employer, may permissibly fire an employee for
expressive conduct that seriously disrupts a governmental workplace. My point here is
much narrower: The Court's reasons for permitting restrictions on government employees' speech partially explain why a cause of action for hostile work environment harassment generally poses few First Amendment problems.
22. Burlington Indus. Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751 (1998) ("Cases based on
threats which are carried out are referred to often as quid pro quo cases, as distinct from
bothersome attentions or sexual remarks that are sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment.").
23. Id.
24. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993) (holding that comments, conduct, or requests for sexual favors must be severe or pervasive enough to alter
the terms and conditions of work environment both in the plaintiff's eyes and in the eyes
of a reasonable person).
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Employers are not automatically liable for all forms of harassment of their employees. When supervisors harass their subordinates, Title VII will not hold employers vicariously liable for
hostile work environment harassment if the employer provided
adequate measures to prevent and remedJ harassment and the
victim failed to take advantage of them. 5 Harassment of employees by coworkers or other third parties, such as an employer's customers, is treated differently. In those cases, Title
VII holds employers liable for such harassment if the employer
knew or should have known about the harassment but failed to
prevent or correct it. 26 This standard comes from the common
law principle that a master may be liable for negligently failing
to protect servants from torts. 27 "Environmental harassment"
cases most often fall into the second category because they usually involve claims that coworkers or third parties have created
the hostile work environment.
No one who has criticized sexual harassment law on free
speech grounds has ever claimed that the First Amendment prohibits the government from barring quid pro quo harassment.
This fact is interesting because quid pro quo harassment is, as a
formal matter, perpetrated by "speech"- verbal or written
threats to withhold job benefits. Critics of the hostile work environment cause of action quickly concede that threats are not
"speech" under the First Amendment 28 because they are "performatives. "29
This concession significantly complicates, and ultimately
undermines, the First Amendment attack on hostile work environment liability. The difference between regulable performatives and protected "speech" is neither sharp nor logically derived. The difference is a function of social context. 30 The same
statement can be a performative in one context but "speech" in
another. If I say, "I'd really like a steak," to my companion while
we are marooned on a desert island, I am wistfully describing a
desire unlikely to be fulfilled. If I say it to a waiter, I make a con25. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742,765 (1998).
26. Id. at 758-59.
27. See Restatement (2d) of Agency§ 213(d).
28. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Comment, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1791, 1800 (1992) (stating that "quid pro quo harassment ... would seemingly be as unprotected by the First Amendment as any other form
of threat or extortion").
29. Schauer, Speech-ing at 663 (cited in note 7).
30. Post, Sexual Harassment and the Firs£ Amendment at 604 (cited in note 15) (arguing that constitutional treatment of superficially identical communication depends on
"the social matrix within which meaning is embedded").
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tract by accepting the restaurant's implicit offer to sell a particular cut of meat, as described on the menu and at the listed price.
At a political rally, I might refer to the state of the American
economy (remember Mondale's "Where's the beef"?).
These are not unique examples. The Ninth Circuit closely
divided over whether "Wanted" and "Guilty" posters featuring
the names, pictures, and whereabouts of several abortion providers were actual, unlawful threats or political advocacy. 31
Cases like this one are difficult, because often nothing about the
utterance itself-not the syntax, the punctuation, or the word
use- distinguishes protected, golitical speech from verbal actions and regulable utterances. The distinction between threats
and political bluster depends on conventions that are often only
implicitly understood-the cultural understandings of the people
who are communicating, where the exchange takes place, the relationship between the parties, and the intended purpose of the
words. 33 Think of a protester at a peace rally who waves the
banner: "George W. Bush: WANTED for Crimes against the
People of Iraq." We know instinctively that she has made a protected, political statement about the war in Iraq, not put a
bounty on the President's head. In form, this poster's message
mimics the "Guilty" posters that the Ninth Circuit held to be
true threats. Both posters identify a particular person and that
31. Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life
Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (en bane) (splitting 6-5 over whether a reasonable
person would perceive "Guilty" posters as making a true threat), vacating Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 244 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2001) (2-1 decision) (holding that the posters were protected political advocacy, not punishable threats).
32. Austin, How to Do Things With Words at 11, 53-66 (cited in note 11) (explaining how the distinction between performative and constative utterances cannot be satisfactorily reduced to grammatical and syntactical differences); see also RA V v. City of St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377,385 (1992) (explaining that fighting words are not necessarily devoid
of expressive content; •·sometimes they are quite expressive indeed"); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569, 573-74 (1942) (rinding that arguably political statementssaying the marshal was "a God damned racketeer" and a "damned Fascist and the whole
government or Rochester are Fascists or agents of Fascists" -nonetheless consisted of
unprotected fighting words).
33. Austin, How to Do Things With Words at 26-32 (cited in note 11) (describing
performatives as dependent on "an accepted conventional procedure having a certain
conventional effect, the procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances.") See also, e.g., United States v. Hart, 212 F.3d 1067, 1072
(8th Cir. 2000) (finding defendant's placement of a Ryder truck in the driveway of an
abortion clinic was a threat because after the Oklahoma City bombing, a reasonable person would perceive the truck as expressing the intent to harm workers in the clinic); Rice
v. Paladin Enters., 128 F.3d 233, 249 (4th Cir. 1997) (denying summary judgment based
on a First Amendment defense by the publisher of a murder for hire book used by a
hired killer because the book gave detailed, precise instructions, the publisher stipulated
that it intended it to help criminals commit crimes, and the book contained "not even a
hint" that the author was engaging in "abstract advocacy").

2002]

CERTAIN ILLUSIONS ABOUT SPEECH

401

person's "crime." The president, however, is often the subject of
impassioned hyperbole-Robert Watts was neither the first nor
the last to wish a president dead. 34 Identifying the president does
not really single him out, but identifying an otherwise anonymous abortion doctor does. Remove the particular doctors'
names from the "Guilty" posters, so that they read, "Abortion
Doctors: WANTED for MURDER!", and they become protected speech.35 Performatives, in short, are dependent on cultural norms and contextual clues for their meaning.
Courts sift through many contextual factors to determine
whether government may regulate some statement or expression
as a threat or solicitation, or whether it is protected speech.
These factors include whether expression is targeted to a specific
person or to a group, whether it is communicated in public
rather than in private, whether the speaker has authority to direct the actions of the listeners, and whether the expression
urges some specific purpose or more general goals. 36
Verbal interactions between supervisors and subordinates
and among coworkers often share many of the characteristics of
unprotected speech. Expression among workers is often targeted
to a specific person or to small, identifiable groups of people; interactions take place in a quasi-private space not generally open
to the public; and often a speaker at work has authority to direct
the actions of those addressed, or at least to affect another's ability to perform his job. A supervisor or coworker's threatening
remarks are more likely to be taken seriously rather than lightly
dismissed as "popping off."
Two propositions follow from this observation. First, when
people engage in expression at work they generally expect their
discussions with their bosses and coworkers to have an "instru34. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 705-06 (1969) (per curiam) (holding as
a matter of law that defendant's statement, "If they ever make me carry a rifle the first
man I want to get in my sights is L. B. J." was political hyperbole); Rankin v. McPherson,
483 U.S. 378 (1987) (a clerk in the constable's office wished that the next person who
tried to shoot President Reagan would "get him"); sec also Planned Parenthood, 290
F.3d at 1072 (observing that the Supreme Court in Watts v. United States had "considered
context and determined that Watts's statement was political hyperbole instead of a true
threat").
35. See Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1078-80 (relying on the fact that "Guilty"
posters and the Nuremberg Files web page identified particular abortion doctors in finding that they were true threats).
36. See Greenawalt, Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language at 228-29, 232-33,
243-45, 249-52 (cited in note 10); cf. Frederick F. Schauer, Language, Truth, and the First
Amendment: An Essay in Memory of Harry Canter, 64 Va. L. Rev. 263, 266 (1978) (noting that the truth or falsity of an allegedly defamatory statement "must turn on the use of
language" and on whether the speaker "violates society's linguistic conventions").
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mental" overlay-that is, they expect their conversations at work
to be about work or, at least indirectly, to affect their work. Second, most discussions and interactions within the workplace can,
in fact, affect a worker's productivity and make it harder for her
to do her job.
If these propositions are true, then the reasons for not insulating quid pro quo harassment from liability imply that hostile
work environment harassment should not be protected either,
with one caveat. It is possible that expression claimed to create a
hostile work environment might contribute to public discourse in
a way that quid pro quo demands do not. If that is true in a particular case, that may be a reason to protect the expression under the First Amendment.
The Court has taken these two propositions about workplace speech for granted when it has reviewed restrictions on
government employees' expression37 and restrictions on employer speech in the labor relations context. 38 These assumptions
have thus shaped the boundaries of appropriate employee expression at work and permissible disciplinary responses by employers. In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Company/ 9 for example, the
Court relied on these factors to create a very broad definition of
unlawful threats of reprisal against employees seeking to unionize. Gissel held that an employer's statements about the potentially damaging effects of unionization were unlawful threats
unless they were based on "objective fact[s]" about the "demonstrably probable consequences" of unionization or unless they
"convey[ ed] a management decision already arrived at to close
the plant in case of unionization." 40 In other words, an employer
must be able to prove its predictions about the effects of unionization before it can worry aloud to its employees. Undocumented, idle predictions are threats.
The Court defined threats broadly for two reasons. First,
the "context of [the] labor relations setting" 41 and the employees' economic dependence made it more likely that workers
would "pick up intended implications"- that is, veiled threats37. See, e.g., Givhan v. Wescern Line Canso/. Sch. Disc., 439 U.S. 410, 414 (1979)
(holding that the rights of employees to comment on matters of public concern "must be
balanced against the interests of the state as employer, in promoting the efficiency of
public services it performs though its employees" and citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ.,
391 u.s. 563, 568 (1968)).
38. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575,617-18 (1969).
39. 395 u.s. 575 (1969).
40. !d. at 618.
41. Id.at617.
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from an employer's comments. A "more disinterested ear" 42
might dismiss similar comments. Second, the Court noted that
most workers would not expect to engage in free-spirited debate
about general political issues and would not take the employer's
comments about unionization as such. "[W]hat is ... at stake is
the establishment of a nonpermanent, limited relationship
[among] the employer, his economically dependent employee
and his union agent"- that is, the formation of a relationship
among a particular set of workers, a particular union, and a particular company, in which the workers have a direct economic
stake. These facts made it unlikely that a worker could hear the
employer's comments objectively. Company executives would be
freer to talk in hearings before Congress because an "independent voter" could "listen more objectively." 43 The same would be
true if company executives were being interviewed by the New
York Times. A newspaper reader expects to encounter spirited
debates on matters of public interest, and is free to believe or
question a newspaper's content. The Court, in other words, recognizes that expression in the workplace often has a different
character, or even a different meaning, than expression in the
public square. Workers often orient themselves differently to
workplace speech and to speakers in the workplace than they do
to expression they encounter on television, on street corners,
and in the newspaper.
Let us now examine in more detail expression as it occurs in
various workplace contexts.
C. EXPRESSION IN "ORDINARY" WORKPLACES
Workplaces and public places have varying relationships to
public discourse. The public library and the Chicago Art Institute are directly connected to public discourse, while Macy's is
not. Though every public accommodation or forum is indeed
someone's workplace, not all workplaces are public accommodations, and not all public accommodations relate to public discourse. The traditional ones-inns, trains, buses, and the likedo not. Let's begin our examination of workplace expression
with some run-of-the-mill workplaces-a manufacturing plant, a
company designed to provide some service like construction or
accounting, or a company like 3M, Microsoft, or Genentech that
researches, develops, or creates new products. Though fairly di42.
43.

ld.
ld.at617-18.
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verse, these workplaces are similar in two respects. First, the
goal of the company is to develop, produce, or sell some thing or
service outside of the scope of the First Amendment. Second,
the workplace premises are not public accommodations or otherwise open to members of the public.
1.

Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards and the issue of
"protected" but harassing speech

The plaintiff in Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards44 was
one of a few skilled women craftworkers employed at a shipyard.45 She complained that the girlie calendars, pornographic
centerfolds and sexually graphic cartoons and graffiti in most areas of the shipyard, t-shirts her coworkers sometimes wore, and
graphically sexual remarks her coworkers made 46 created a
sexually hostile work environment. The district court agreed that
the pictures, comments, and graffiti changed the terms, conditions, and privileges of her employment because of her sex. They
violated Title VII because they were "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of {her] employment and create an
abusive working environment," 7 both in her eyes and in the
eyes of a reasonable person. 48
Robinson raised interesting First Amendment issues for two
reasons. First, most of the pictures, cartoons, and graffiti were
not posted with the purpose of insulting her directly. 49 While a
few scribbled remarks referred to her, 50 many of the pictures had
been posted before she began working at the shipyard. She objected to them because she found them offensive and because
they made it harder for her to do her job. Second, her Title VII
claim rested on utterances, writings, and pictures that the First
Amendment ordinarily would protect if they had been expressed
outside of the workplace. 51 Jacksonville Shipyards defended it-

44. 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
45. Id. at 1491.
46. ld. at 1496-99.
47. ld. at 1523.
48. Id. at 1524-25. See also Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,21-22 (1993).
49. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1522-23. Some of the graffiti was directed at her, but
most of the pictures were not.
50. Id. at 1498-99 (detailing references to "boola-boola" jokes about her and sexual
graffiti written above the hook upon which she hung her jacket).
51. Sable Communications of Cal., Inc., v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1990) ("[S]exual
expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment");
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (same); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)
(holding that wearing a "Fuck the Draft" jacket was protected expression).
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self on this ground, arguing that the postings were protected
speech.
The Robinson court rejected the free speech defense. The
court reasoned that behavior that is tolerable or even appropriate in some contexts can be abusive in the workplace52 and that
this case represented one such instance. The defendants, however, also argued that the pictures, despite their offensiveness,
were protected by the First Amendment. Though the case did
not state as much, the defendants appeared to rely on the First
Amendment principle that generally prohibits the government
from regulating expression because it causes offense. 53 To hold
the shipyard liable for the speech's offense would be a classic
content or viewpoint restriction. The court, however, dismissed
this proposition, holding that "the pictures and verbal harassment are not protected speech because they act as discriminatory conduct in the form of a hostile work environment." 54 The
court quoted Roberts v. United States Jaycees: 55 "Potentially expressive activities that produce special harms distinct from their
communicative impact ... are entitled to no constitutional protection. " 56
The court's assertion that the pictures amounted to discriminatory conduct, however, simply assumed that conclusion.
It is true that if these pictures and graffiti appeared elsewhere,
they would have been protected. The court's assertion does not
explain why they could be regulated in the workplace context.
The citation to Roberts compounded rather than resolved the
problem. In Robinson the very offensiveness of the pictures is
what caused the discrimination; the communicative impact of the
speech and the "special harm" it causes are identical. The Robinson court therefore cannot say that the harm-the discrimination- from the pictures is distinct from their offensiveness. Or
can it?
It is too quick to say that the First Amendment does notallow government to restrict speech because it causes offense. The
scope of permissible restrictions varies greatly depending on
where expression occurs. Had Matt Fraser exhorted college stu52. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1525-26 ("(T]he whole point of the sexual harassment
claim is that behavior that may be permissible in some settings ... can be abusive in the
workplace"). (ellipses in original) (citations omitted).
53. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24-25.
54. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1535.
55. RobertS v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
56. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1535 (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628).
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dents, not high school students, to vote for a student council
candidate because he ''doesn't attack things in spurts-he drives
hard, pushing and pushing until finally-he succeeds," Fraser's
speech would have been protected. 57 Had Frank Snepp written
about his experiences as a Department of Labor employee,
rather than as a CIA agent, the Court probably would not have
enforced his pre-clearance agreement. 58
It is therefore not surprising that Playboy centerfolds might
represent protected expression in one place but support a cause
of action for harassment in another. The First Amendment
would surely protect centerfolds displayed in a museum gallery.
But if someone in the gallery of a courtroom held up a centerfold for all to see, a judge could hold that person in contempt
because that expression could disrupt courtroom proceedings.
Because context drives the scope of permissible regulations
of expression, the function of the workplace must also affect the
scope of First Amendment protection. The CIA has greater leeway to limit its employees' speech to protect national security
than does the Department of Labor because secrecy is the CIA's
essence but not the Labor Department's. Similarly, the First
Amendment would bar a museum guard's suit if she complained
that an exhibition of female nudes created a hostile work environment, but not a shipyard worker's suit over similar postings
on the walls of her workplace. Exhibitions are the museum's
mission but not the shipyard's.
2.

Dignitary harms in public discourse

Legal actions for offense or disruption caused by utterances
or writings are commonplace. Defamation, libel, slander, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false-light all provide
recovery for harm caused by speech or writings claimed to be offensive.
When faced with conflicts between suits for dignitary torts
and the First Amendment, the Court has not always favored the
First Amendment. The Court has been primarily interested in
ensuring "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate 59 in particular arenas of life. In New York Times v. Sullivan, the Court
57. See Bethel Sch. Disc. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685-86 (1986) (holding that a high
school could punish a student for lewd speech because a "high school assembly or classroom is no place for a sexually explicit monologue directed towards an unsuspecting audience of teenage students").
58. See Snepp v. United Scates, 444 U.S. 507,509 n.3, 510 (1980) (per curiam).
59. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,270 (1964).
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held that public figures and officials who sue a newspaper for libel must prove that the alleged falsehood was published with
knowledge that the item was false or with reckless disregard for
the truth. 60 The Court created this "breathing space" 61 so that
the press will not self-censor to avoid liability. 62 Hustler Magazine v. Falwelt 3 extended the "actual malice" rule to intentional
infliction of emotional distress claims by public figures. Presumably, other tort actions by public figures objecting to comments about them would also face the "actual malice" standard.64
The court cases that have created and sustained the
"breathing room" provided by the New York Times's actual malice standard have generally been cases in which a public person
has objected to his or her treatment in the press. In New York
Times, the plaintiff was an Alabama sheriff who had been mentioned in an advertisement in the Times. This allegedly libeled
official had been an outspoken opponent of integration and had
trumpeted his segregationist views. In Hustler, Jerry Falwell, the
founder and leader of the "Moral Majority" 65 and an active political commentator, 66 complained that a Campari ad parody in
Hustler Magazine, which portrayed him as having lost his virginity to his drunken mother in the family's outhouse, was intentional infliction of emotional distress.
New York Times does not mean that public officials and figures are not hurt by insult and invective. 67 Rather, New York
Times bars legal actions for their injuries because the Constitution elevates the importance of debate about public matters and
public firures over any state interest in protecting public figures'
dignity. 6 The similarities between Hustler and New York
60. ld. at 279-80.
61. ld. at 272.
62. ld. at 279.
63. 485 U.S. 46,56 (1988).
64. But see Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 572-75 (1977)
(finding that the tort for recovery of economic advantage was distinct from dignitary
torts for First Amendment purposes).
65. The Moral Majority lobbied for school prayer and instruction on creationism in
public schools, and fought the Equal Rights Amendment, abortion rights, and rights for
gays and lesbians. Columbia Encyclopedia 6th Ed.2001, at <http://www.bartleby.com/
65/c-/E-MoralMajo.html> (last visited April 25, 2003).
66. Sec Falwell, 485 U.S. at 47 (observing that Falwell was "active as a commentator on politics" in the 1980s).
67. See Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1321, 1321
(1992) ("[R ]obust free speech systems protect speech not because it is harmless, but despite the harm it may cause.").
68. See id. at 1322 ("[Ejxisting understandings of the First Amendment presuppose
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Times- both involved press publications and criticisms of wellknown people active in state and national politics-are no coincidence. These facts, as well as the fact that the offending ad
parody in Hustler was well within the tradition of political satire,
were crucial to the Court's application of the actual malice standard to the plaintiffs' claims of libel, defamation, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. 69
In Hustler, the Court recognized that Falwell was bound to
attract criticism, some of it intemperate and possibly juvenile
and scatological, because he had put himself out on the national
political stage as a moral leader and had publicly advocated controversial ideas. "[O]ne of the prerogatives of American citizenship is the right to criticize public men and measures. " 70 Public
figures become subjects of discourse as well as participants by
choosing to enter the fray. The attention they receive will not
always be positive, and some of it might be quite vicious. Intemperate, hyperbolic, colorful criticism ~rabs listeners' attention
and telegraphs the speaker's emotions. 1 "The distortion of language to emphasize a point" -presenting Jerry Falwell as a
white-trash hypocrite who screws his mother-"is present in
varying degrees in virtually all human dialogue." 72 First
Amendment "protection cannot" therefore "turn on whether a
speaker's metaphor fits the plain and natural meaning of the
words used." 73 For these reasons, speech about public figures receives extra protection from tort suits. 74
The Court's immunization of most public criticisms of public figures from tort actions does not deny the outrage, trauma,
and hurt Falwell and other plaintiffs suffer. 75 Indeed, the Hustler
that legal toleration of speech-related harm is the currency with which we as a society
pay for First Amendment protection").
69. The court explained in Falwell:
The sort of robust political debate encouraged by the First Amendment is
bound to produce speech that is critical of those who hold public office or those
public figures who arc 'intimately involved in the resolution of important public
questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society at large.'
485 U.S. at 51 (citation omitted).
70. Id. (citing Baumgartner v. United States., 322 U.S. 665, 673-74 (1944) (Frankfurter, J.)).
71. Schauer, 64 Va. L. Rev. at 284 (cited in note 36).
72. Id. at 285.
73. Id.
74. Sec Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 337-39 (1974) (describing how
public figures and officials, unlike private individuals, have the ability to "secur[e] access
to channels of communication sufficient to rebut falsehoods concerning" them and have
"voluntarily placed" themselves "in the public spotlight").
75. Cf. Schauer, 92 Colum. L. Rev. at 1323 (cited in note 67) ("[T]he harms ensuing
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ad-parody probably did outrage and traumatize Falwell. But neither does the law allow Falwell recovery for his injuries because
it might chill debate that is more important to the community
than permitting recovery for that trauma. Whether Jerry Falwell
was a hypocrite or a sincerely moral person affected people's
opinions about his and the Moral Majority's involvement in national politics. It is impossible to talk about politics without talking about specific public and political figures, their character,
and their trustworthiness.
3.

Offense outside of public discourse and workplace
harassment

The reasons behind Falwell's and Sullivan's defeats do not
apply to most tort actions based on expression. In most cases, a
private person (as opposed to a public official or rmblic figure)
may sue others who have negligently defamed her. 76 Employers
may be sued for defamation when they give terrible references
about former employees. 77 As a result, many employers now decline to give substantive references for former employees. 78
While this trend is unfortunate, it is hardly a First Amendment
issue, at least as currently conceived by First Amendment doctrine.79
Nor do the reasons behind Falwell's and Sullivan's defeats
apply more generally to the workplace. The First Amendment
restricts public officials and public figures from recovering for
defamation or intentional infliction of emotional distress because allowing them to recover would diminish public discourse,
and we believe public discourse is more important than complete
tort recovery. 80 The decision to ignore injuries caused by individual torts to create "breathing room" for more valuable speech
from factually erroneous statements about identified individuals are hard to deny").
76. Sec Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347 ("[S]o long as they do not impose liability without
fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability" for
defamation); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 763 (1985)
(holding that states may impose liability for negligence if defamatory statement was
about a private person and was not about a matter of public concern).
77. See, e.g., Jensen v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 14 Cal. App. 4th 958, 965 (Cal. App.
1993); Marshall v. Brown, 141 Cal. App. 3d 408, 412-13 (Cal. App. 1983); Cal. Lab.
Code,§ 1050 (misdemeanor to misrepresent the facts regarding a former employee to
prevent the employee's further employment), § 1054 (treble damages for misrepresenting
employment facts).
78. See Bradley Saxton, Flaws in the Laws Governing Employment References:
Problems of "Overdeterrence" and a Proposal for Reform, 13 Yale L. & Policy Rev. 45,
45-48 (1995).
79. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 763.
80. Sec Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46,50 (1988).
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would sit uncomfortably in the highly regulated, instrumental
domain of most ordinary workplaces.
Unlike defamation or emotional distress claims brought by
public figures, liability for workplace harassment does not
threaten public discourse. Public figures are the currency
through which we discuss public affairs; private employees are
not. The hostile work environment cause of action does not raise
the classic First Amendment worry-that government will suppress speech critical of it or with which a majority disagrees 81 or
impinge on public discourse generally. 82 The purpose is to allow
women and minorities to go as far and make as much money as
white men, and to equalize the yield from working by equalizing
the cost of working for all, regardless of their membership in a
protected class. Though expression may create liability, that liability rests on economic concerns, not concerns grounded in the
social mores of a particular community or political faction.
This economic harm arises in part from injury to the plaintiff's personality, much as defamation, libel, slander, and intentional infliction of emotional distress do. 83 The Robinson court
recognized this kind of insult to personality:
When the pre-existing state of the work environment receives
weight in evaluating its hostility to women, only those women
who are willing to and can accept the level of abuse inherent
in a given workplace-a place that may have historically been
all male or historically excluded women intentionally-will
apply to and continue to work there. It is absurd to believe
that Title VII opened the doors of such places in form and
closed them in substance. A pre-existing atmosphere that deters women from entering or continuing in a profession or job
is no less destructive to and offensive to workplace equality
84
than a sign declaring "Men Only. "
81. New York Times' "actual malice" standard for defamation of public officials in
large part grows out of the concern that the government will attempt to ban seditious
libel.
82. See Hustler, 485 U.S. at 55-56 (describing the importance of insulting politi..:al
cartoons about public officials and figures to public discourse and expressing concern
that juries might impose liability for speech that ran counter to community mores).
83. See Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 Harv. L.
Rev. 445. 509-511 (1997) (describing a hostile work environment as "fundamentally an
injury to dignity," and comparing the hostile work environment cause of action to dignitary torts). But see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the
First Amendment Dog that Didn't Bark, 1994 S. Ct. Rev. 1, 9-11 (arguing that Harris v.
Forklift Systems refused to narrow hostile work environment to fit the boundaries of intentional infliction of emotional distress).
84. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1526 (M.D. Fla.
1991). Robinson's analogy to "Men Only" signs implicitly categorizes the pornography at
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Even if the explicit or implicit message of posters, jokes, or graffiti is not "men only," insults, derogatory jokes and pornography
undermine the conditions necessary for equal employment opportunity. One can view posters, jokes, and graffiti as creating a
particular workplace community and defining community members as men who fuck women, rather than work with (or, heaven
forbid, for) them. Disrupting discourse that defines the community or sub-community, or at least declaring it illicit from the
employer's point of view, allows the workplace community to be
redefined to include women. In that sense, the hostile work environment cause of action serves as the inverse of the First
Amendment. It is a rule that forces men to suspend the norms of
the particular community they would like to constitute to permit
competing community visions to take hold.
4.

Workplaces must enforce civility norms to be productive,
while public discourse requires their suspension

Civility among workers is necessary to maintain conditions
of equality. Expression that denegrates members of a protected
class may thwart equal opportunity even if it does not explicitly
communicate an exclusionary message. Antidiscrimination laws
and the hostile work environment cause of action enforce a kind
of civility norm within the workplace- the norm of equal opportunity regardless of race, sex, national origin, color, and disability. In particular, the hostile work environment cause of action
regulates workplace interactions to maintain conditions conducive to equal opportunity.
O'Shea v. Yellow Technology Services, Inc. 85 illustrates the
importance of civility to equal opportunity. Maurine O'Shea alleged that a coworker's derogatory comments about womenboth about her and about women generally-undermined her
productivity. 86 O'Shea "overheard [her coworker] making fun of
his wife" and other women, saying that "women talk too much
and are less intelligent than men," and that "Playbol is superior
to a wife because ... with Playboy you get variety." 8 He also described a dream he had about a naked woman jumping on a
trampoline, describing this woman's breasts in detail. 88 Overthe shipyard as performatives. The court's analogy assumes women would read the porn
as the equivalent of being told to work elsewhere.
85. 185 F.3d 1093 (lOth Cir. 1999).
86. !d. at 1098-1100.
87. !d. at 1098.
88. !d.
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heard remarks such as these might be characterized as "environmental harassment," in contrast to insults particularly directed at one person. This coworker, O'Shea alleged, also told
other workers that O'Shea "was incompetent and unable to do
her job," that she was "overemotional and hysterical," and that
women were generally "incompetent, stupid, and scatterbrained. " 89
When O'Shea complained, her coworkers ostracized her. 90
Before this coworker joined O'Shea's team, O'Shea's supervisor
had described her as "a very competent systems programmer,"
"a team player," and "cooperative." 91 After her coworker began
denegrating her and other women and complaining to other coworkers that O'Shea was "going to file a sexual harassment suit
against him," her coworkers "cut off contact with her" and
"treat[ed] her poorly.'.n "[M]ale programmers never invited
[her] to lunch outside of the office unless she invited herself,"
and they shifted their discussions about work-related technical
matters to sports to exclude her from conversation. 93 They ignored her when she tried to discuss mutual work projects with
them. When she complained about being ostracized, her supervisor (who was also a woman) held a meeting with the men involved. The meeting compounded the rift. 94 Ultimately, some of
her coworkers "stonewalled" her, refused "to communicate with
her," and "respond[ed] to her questions ... with monosyllabic
answers." They refused to give her computer files she needed to
get work done. 95 Over time, she was seen as the problem because she was increasingly paranoid and insecure. 96
O'Shea highlights the connection between collegial relations
with coworkers and on-the-job productivity: work interactions
that are ostensibly social (kibbitzing, ~oing to lunch, etc.) also
affect an individual's job performance. 7 O'Shea also illustrates

89. Id.
90. Id. at 1099-1100.
91. ld.
92. Id. at 1099.
93. Id. at 1099-1100.
94. ld. at 1100.
95. Id. at 1099-1101.
96. Id.
97. Robert Post has described "the unique power" of "(o]utrageous speech ... [to]
call[] community identity into question [and] ... to focus attention, dislocate old assumptions, and shock its audience into the recognition of unfamiliar forms of life." Robert C.
Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic
Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 601,632, (1990).
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that work roles affect worker's interactions and that people at
work do not encounter each other on an equal footing.
Work roles inhibit the expression of individual personalities
and restrict how people interact. Hierarc~ and power shape the
dynamics of discussion in the workplace. 8 Arguing with a boss
feels different than arguing with a friend, whether the argument
is about politics or business, because a boss wields power-to
fire, set salaries, and determine readiness for promotion. For instance, any law teacher who has ever argued with a first-year
student is aware of the feeling of arguing with someone not her
equal. The disparity arises in part from the fact that the teacher
possesses more knowledge, but also from the fact that the
teacher has power over the student.
Arguments with coworkers at work also have a different
dynamic from arguments outside work. The very fact of being at
work restricts the intensity, style, and tone of arguments because
the desire to remain employed almost always mediates behavior
at work. Our economic dependence on work restricts what we
can discuss, how we talk about things, and the positions we are
willing to advocate while we are at work. In this way, a workplace resembles Robert Post's description of a community: 99 for
a workplace to be productive, members must agree with the
norms and ends of the workplace and place them above their
private interests. At least, individuals must be willing to behave
as if they agree with the norms and aims of the workplace.
Current work norms usually require us to favor work over
kibbitzing and conducting our personal affairs. Consequently,
much workplace expression is instrumental to doing work. People may talk about a number of things at work, but it is work
that brought them there and constitutes, at least initially, the basis for their discussions. At work, talk about things other than
work is incidental to work and, at a moment's notice, may legitimately be disrupted by the superior demands of work.
(Things are trickier when a workplace's mission is the production of discourse, but more on that point in section D.)
In the government-employee speech cases, the Court has
repeatedly recognized that employees' expression takes a back98. Post, Sexual Harassment and the First Amendment at 611 (cited in note 15).
99. Id. at 614-15 (cited in note 15) ("'fT]hc workplace has constitutionally been understood as a site of community, not democracy."); Post, 103 Harv. L. Rev. at 632-35
(cited in note 97) (contrasting the public sphere, in which the Constitution requires the
suspension of civility norms, with communities and the private sphere, both of which require civility norms to exist).

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

414

[Vol. 19:391

seat to doing work. First Amendment doctrine has thus made
way for the practical necessities of controlling "expression" in
this work context. Quite simply, governmental organizations
have a strong interest in "promot[ing] efficiency and integrity in
the discharge of official duties, and [in] maintain[ing] proper discipline in the public service." 100
To this end, the Government, as an employer, must have wide
discretion and control over the management of its personnel
and internal affairs. This includes the prerogative to remove
employees whose conduct hinders efficient operation and to
do so with dispatch. Prolonged retention of a disruptive or
otherwise unsatisfactory employee can adversely affect discipline and morale in the work place, foster disharmond:, and ultimately impair the efficiency of an office or agency. 1 1

Consequently, government employers face few constraints when
firing employees for expression that disrupts the workplace, if
that expression does not address matters of public concern.
Even when political speech is involved, government employers can fire em~loyees who disrupt the workplace. In Rankin v. McPherson, 1 2 the Supreme Court held that a clerical
worker in a county constable's office could not be fired for remarking to a coworker, within the deputy constable's earshot,
that she hoped that the next person who tried to shoot President
Reagan would "get him." This case is often cited as an example
of the limits on government employers' power to regulate employees' speech. Rankin, however, is based on the assumption
that government can sometimes regulate its employees' political
speech. A government employer may do so if the "balance between the interests of the employee, as a citizen, in commenting
upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as
an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it
performs through its employees" 103 tips in favor of the government employer's interest. Factors in this analysis include
"whether the statement impairs discipline by superiors or harmony among co-workers, has a detrimental impact on close
working relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence
are necessary, or impedes the performance of the speaker's du104
ties or interferes with the regular operation of the enterprise."
100.
101.
I 02.
103.
I 04.

Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150-51 (1983).
Id.
483 U.S. 378 (1987).
!d. at 384 (quoting Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).
!d. at 388.
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McPherson could not be fired for her remark because no one
could interpret it as seriously advocating or validating violence
against the president. The constable's office could not show that
McPherson's comment disrupted work or that it evinced a
"character trait that made" her "unfit" to work. 105 Instead,
McPherson was fired because the remark rankled Rankin. 106
The First Amendment does not absolutely shield employees
who speak out on matters of public concern. 107 The Court in
Rankin took pains to explain that when an employee's speech on
a matter of public concern does disrupt a government office, a
government employer can fire the employee. 108 Rankin cited
McCullen v. Carson, an Eleventh Circuit case, for this proposition. In McCullen, the Jacksonville sheriff's department fired
McCullen, a clerical employee, who had said on local television
news that he worked for the sheriff's office and, in his spare
time, recruited for the Ku Klux Klan.
The Eleventh Circuit found that public outrage and internal
dissension within the police department justified McCullen's
dismissal even though he was a records clerk and could not arrest anyone. Keeping him would have enraged Jacksonville's
Black community and made law enforcement more difficult and
dangerous. "Efficient law enforcement requires mutual respect,
trust, and support" between the community and the police. 109
Employing someone who declared himself a member of the Klan
would have created the impression that the police department
did not treat individuals impartially. 110 "Jacksonville's black
community ... would categorically distrust the Sheriff's office if
a known Klan member were permitted to stay on in any position."'" McCullen's presence also threatened the department's
"esprit de corps,"" as his very presence angered African
American members of the police force. 113 McCullen shows that
105. Id. at 389 n.l4 (explaining that Constable Rankin testified that "[he] did not
base [his] action on whether the work was interrupted or not").
106. !d. at 390 ("[I]t is undisputed that [Rankin] fired McPherson based on the content of her speech ... and because [Rankin] believed that she 'meant it."').
107. Sec Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (holding that the rights
of an employee to comment on matters of public concern must be balanced against the
interests of the government employer in providing efficient public services); accord
Givhan v. Western Line Canso/. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410,414 (1979).
108. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 389, 391 n.18 (citing McMullen v. Carson, 754 F.2d 936
(11th Cir. 1985)).
I 09. McCullen v. Carson, 754 F.2d 936, 939 (11th Cir. 1985).
110. Id. at 938.
Ill. Id. at 939.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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the need to maintain civility norms within some work~laces can
make speech's offense a legitimate basis for regulation. 14
Let us now leave the work context for the public square.
Within the realm of public discourse, the First Amendment requires that we suspend our normal rules of civility. The First
Amendment supports the expression of plural views by allowing
speakers to communicate their ideas and vie for others' attention
and sympathy, even if the government disagrees with them. 115
Standing alone, government neutrality about the substance of
opinions is not enough to support vibrant public discourse. Government must also remain (mostly) neutral about how opinions
are expressed. If government can punish the manner of communication, it is harder to express opinions that differ from prevailing community viewpoints. 116
Consider flag burning. A flag-burner can certainly communicate the same idea by shouting, "Down with the United
States!" The shout, though, lacks the extreme outrage of burning
our nation's symbol. Were the government to bow to veterans'
groups outraged by flag-burning, protesters could not convey an
important aspect of their message. Civility norms are not universal-some are mortally offended by flag burning (Justice Stevens, for example 117 ), while others are not. The government,
therefore, cannot enforce civility norms within the public sphere
without enforcing the norms of some community. Enforcing the
norms of one community-say, banning flag burning, thereby
enforcing the norms of veterans as against war protesters"support[s] some communities and repress[es] others." 118
Within the realm of public discourse, plaintiffs face a heavy,
often insurmountable, burden when suing for defamation or intentional infliction of emotional distress. New York Times v. Sullivan,119 Hustler v. Falwel/, 120 and Gertz v. Robert Welch 121 held
that community standards of offensiveness (on which intentional
infliction of emotional distress is explicitly based and defamation
114. Sometimes government agencies can even make political affiliation a condition
of employment. "[I]f an employee's private political beliefs would interfere with the discharge of his public duties, his First Amendment rights may be required to yield to the
State's vital interest in maintaining governmental effectiveness and efficiency." Branti v.
Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 517 (1980) (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 366 (1976).
115. Post, 103 Harv. L. Rev. at 629-30 (cited in note 97).
116. Id. at 638-42.
117. Sec Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,436 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
118. Post, 103 Harv. L. Rev. at 629-30 (cited in note 97).
119. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
120. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988).
121. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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implicitly based) cannot be used to punish speech when it is
about matters of public importance and where the person claiming harm is a public figure. As the Court explained in Falwell,
the New York Times standard protects a "world of debate about
public affairs." 122 Thus, in Garrison v. Louisiana, the Court held
that a person who vilified a public official could be held liable
for defamation only if he acted with actual malice. 123 Likewise, in
Lewis v. City of New Orleans, the Court held that cursing a police officer cannot be grounds for arrest. 124
Most of these cases involve expression that is addressed to a
number of persons. This is no accident. Attending a live speech,
reading something in a newspaper or magazine, or hearing a
speech on the radio or television buffers the audience from the
speaker and his message. This buffer permits the audience to reflect on what is said rather than simply react to what is said. A
person can read and digest information in a newspaper or magazine, and audience members can leave or tune the speech out.
The one exception, Lewis v. City of New Orleans, involves a
public officer who is required by his official role to react in an
impersonal way to members of the public. Police officers are the
government officials closest to such protests, and are therefore
the most likely to be the objects of offensive acts. Allowing police officers, through arrest or suit, to penalize offensive expression they encounter on the job could suppress an enormous
amount of expression, from parades to anti-government tirades.
Many ordinary workplaces have little in common with these
cases. Expression within ordinary workplaces rarely resembles
public discourse. People in public places can more easily avoid
derogatory or graphic jokes or degrading graffiti or images than
workers can. More importantly, workers may orient themselves
differently to expression in the workplace than they do to expression that appears in a newsgaper or magazine or is shouted
from the steps of a courthouse. 1 By no means was the Robinson
plaintiff a "reader," "viewer," or "spectator" of the pornographic images and graffiti at the shipyard-she encountered
that expression differently than someone who is leafing through

122. Falwell, 485 U.S. at 53.
123. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64,78 (1964).
124. 415 U.S. 130,131-32 (1974).
125. Sec Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (holding that state could not ban
Cohen from wearing his "Fuck the Draft" jacket hccause others were free to avert their
eyes if his message offended them).
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a magazine. Nor was O'Shea a "member of an audience" when
her coworker ruminated about Playboy's superiority.
Thus, if the line between the private sphere and the realm
of public discourse marks the shift from the commitments of a
particular community to values such as "neutrality, diversity, and
individualism," 126 ordinary workr,laces usually stand outside of
the realm of public discourse. 1 7 Such workplaces are rarely
characterized by employees' unfettered debate on a broad range
of topics. Outside academia, few workplaces are dedicated to
fostering freewheeling expression of plural viewpoints.
Some commentators have argued that work is an increasingly important locus for public debate. It is a mistake, Cynthia
Estlund argues, to treat the workplace as entirely outside of the
realm of public discourse. 128 Work, she says, has become a central place for discourse on public issues because Americans
spend so much time at work 129 (and increasingly less time in
other group settings). 130 Work also provides a unique opportunity for people to talk with "individuals from diverse backgrounds and perspectives," people of other races and ethnicities,
religions, education levels, and class backgrounds. 131 Hierarchical relationships, she concedes, may darken this rosy view of the
workplace as a cross-class and cultural meeting place. 132 She also
126. Post, 103 Harv. L. Rev. at 680 (cited in note 97).
127. Hanna Pitkin's discussion of Hannah Arendt's distinction between the public
realm and the social and private realms illustrates this point. Pitkin contrasts the public
realm, in which "a plurality of perspectives" may and should flourish (Hanna Fenichel
Pitkin, Justice: On Relating Private and Public, 9 Pol. Theory 327, 333 (1981)) and Arendt's conception of public action, which "stresses the urge toward self-disclosure at the
expense of all other factors, and therefore is highly individualistic" (id. at 336 (quotations
omitted)) with the private sphere, which is "governed by necessity" and the need to provide the necessities of life. ld. at 331. The private and social spheres are the spheres "for
labor" and other "activities 'related to the maintenance' of life." Id.
128. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Freedom of Expression in the Workplace and the Problem of Discriminatory Harassment, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 687,720 (1997) ("I will argue for a ...
conception of ... freedom of expression in which the core domain of public discourse is
surrounded by satellite domains of discourse ... such as the workplace.").
129. Id. at 733 (arguing that "most adults spend much of their waking life at work,
and much of the time and space that individuals have for political discussion outside their
families is at work").
!30. Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American
Community (2000) (documenting the decline in civic and social group participation
among Americans).
131. Cynthia L. Estlund, The Architecture of the First Amendment and the Case of
Workplace Harassment, 72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1361, 1375 (1997); see also Estlund, 75
Tex. L. Rev. at 727 (cited in note 128) ("In the workplace individuals interact with others-initially strangers, often from diverse cultural, ethnic, political, and religious backgrounds-in a constructive way toward common aims.").
132. Estlund, 75 Tex. L. Rev. at 728-29 (cited in note 128).
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admits that work requires civility rules to function and to promote equality among workers. 133
Despite these caveats, Professor Estlund argues that the
First Amendment should presumptively shield expression at
work from hostile work environment liability. The presumption
could be overcome if the contested expression falls within "established categories of unprotected speech," 134 if the expression
was "directed at a listener whom the speaker knows" will "be offended on the basis of the listener's" membership in a protected
class, 135 or if it was expressed in a "grossly and manifestly offensive"136 way that offended coworkers could not avoid. 137 Except
in these cases, Professor Estlund would suspend 9overnmentenforced civility rules at work in favor of expression. 38
It is not clear that this proposal would create more protection for speech than existing law. Cases establishing liability for
environmental harassment that the plaintiff could have avoided
are rare, if they exist. And at any rate such liability would be unjustified under current law-something easily avoidable cannot
be severe and pervasive. Her suggestion that actionable environmental harassment be "grossly and manifestly offensive" 139
arguably compounds, not cures, any vagueness problems. Adding adverbs to the constitutionally suspect adjective "offensive"
hardly helps. Is Playboy in, but Hustler out? The terms "hostile
and abusive" are at least somewhat narrower than "offensive,"
and the current legal standard also gives us a benchmark- the
reasonable person. "The reasonable person" standard is a notoriously squishy standard. But a squishy benchmark is better than
none, and "grossly and manifestly offensive" has no benchmark.
Professor Estlund's proposal suffers from other problems.
Her suggestion that expression that falls within "established
categories of unprotected speech" would remain unprotected in
the workplace is too quick. She appears to assume that the
phrase "categories of unprotected speech" designates a particular set of things and that this set can be easily imported from the
realm of public discourse-sidewalks and parks-into the workplace. Whether expression is protected or unprotected is a judg133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 751.
Id. at 752.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

420

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 19:391

judgment based largely on context. Put Officer McPherson in
front of the police department wearing a sandwich board emblazoned with "Hinckley: Next time, don't miss!", and the Court
might have blessed her firing. Had abortion doctors featured on
previous "Guilty" posters not been murdered, the American
Life Coalition's posters might have been protected speech. 140
In the workplace, the very question that must be answered
is how the particular workplace context alters the social meaning
and effect of expression. Because context drives the conclusion
that speech is or is not protected, it is nonsensical to propose
that "established categories of unprotected speech" be applied
to the workplace context.
Significantly, too, Professor Estlund's proposal underestimates the importance of workplace civility rules and the discrimination that would result from their suspension. She does
concede that her picture of the workplace as a locus for debate is
probably idealized because many workplaces are hierarchically
organized. Her portrayal is idealized, but hierarchy is not the
culprit. However a workplace is organized, pluralistic expression
does not typify most work relationships. Work responsibilities
pervade and complicate interactions with coworkers and subordinates and inhibit open and frank exchanges.
Indeed, work structures based on teamwork, rather than
top-down management, seem to make civility among workers
more, not less, important. In the last decade or so many workplaces have moved toward "flatter" organizational structures 141
with looser, more fluid job roles and responsibilities to facilitate
greater teamwork and creativity. 142 Increasingly, employees must
cooperate on projects and assignments. Employees have begun
"to think of their organizational identity as being determined at
least in part by the teams of which they are members. " 143 Failing
140. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Columbia!Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of
Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1048, 1062, 1066, 1080-81 (9th Cir. 2002) (en bane) (citing the fact
that abortion doctors who had been featured on previous "Wanted" posters were murdered as contributing to the "Guilty" posters' threatening nature).
141. Catherine Casey, Work, Self and Society 108 (Routledge, 1995). ("The new
technologies, and the new culture [of teamwork and family], have departed from specialization of knowledge and function, characteristic of industrialism ... to a multiplicity
of knowlcdges and roles. Specialization and demarcation are giving way to generalization
and flexibility.")
142. Sec Michael J. Piore and Charles F. Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide 273,
282 (Basic Books Inc., 1984).
143. Susan Albers Mohrman and Susan G. Cohen, When People Get Out of the Box,
in Ann Howard, cd., The Changing Nature of Work 365, 371 (Jossey-Bass Inc., Pubs.,
1995).
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to get along with one's coworkers "carries" a "big penalty, because the collective [team] product is evaluated," not one individual's part. 144 Getting along with others and being a "good
team player" is essential to a worker's ability to succeed, even in
traditional factory settings and corporate offices. Teamwork
"requires the deliberate creation of a substitute, discursive social
cohesion that is necessary for production to occur. ... Relationship to a product, to team-family members and to the company
displaces identification with occupation and its historic repository of skills, knowledge[] and allegiances. " 145
As O'Shea demonstrates, even low-level environmental
harassment has the potential to isolate and undermine workers.
Professor Estlund admits as much. The very qualities that make
work seem attractive to her as a forum for discussion- that work
is "a collection of individuals who must form relationships and
cooperate toward common aims despite potentially diverse
backgrounds" 146 -make "unconstrained speech" "potentially
explosive." 147 Unconstrained debate can disrupt diverse work
forces more than homogenous ones. Professor Estlund concedes
that uninhibited debate can "inflict greater harms within the
workplace than in the public square, partly because of the close
and ongoing personal engagement that the workplace compels."148 As Jack Balkin has observed, "[f]ew audiences are more
captive than the average worker." 149 Indeed, Professor Estlund
explains that an effort to make the workplace a locus for uninhibited discussions free from civility constraints could backfire:
It could "poison the workplace as a forum for pluralistic exchange and destroy the possibility of constructive engagement."150 In short, harassment and a worker's complaints about
harassment jeopardize a person's status as a team member, keep
her from getting work done, and imperil her job.
If uninhibited discussions can "destroy the possibility of
constructive engagement," 151 why does Professor Estlund want
to make workplaces presumptively part of public discourse? She
hopes, first, that if work is made a place for discussion and de144. Id. at 373.
145. Casey, Work, Self and Society at 109 (cited in note 141).
146. Estlund, 75 Tex. L. Rev. at 735 (cited in note 128).
147. Id.
148. !d.
149. J. M. Balkin, Some Realism about Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the
First Amendment, 1990 Duke L.J. 375,423 (1990).
150. Estlund, 75 Tex. L. Rev. at 735 (cited in note 128).
151. Id.
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bate, then workers will encounter diverse viewpoints and ideas,
become more tolerant of others, and become more engaged
members of our democracy. 152 Second, she hopes that making
work a "satellite domain of public discourse" will increase workers' powers of self-governance within the workplace. 153 Enhancing workers' rights to self-governance by reducing legal protections for equal opportunity is a baffling proposition- federal law
specifically prohibits labor organizations from engaging in discrimination. I am also skeptical that encountering different
viewpoints at work makes people more tolerant of differences.
Would overhearing dirty jokes (seemingly protected under Estlund's proposal) make women more tolerant of men? Would being endlessly proselytized by a coworker make someone more
tolerant of religion? If these interactions make work harder to
do-the central inquiry in hostile work environment cases-it
seems unlikely. Reducing legal protections for equal employment opportunity for uncertain gains in tolerance seems a bad
trade-off.
5.

Liability for harassment based on political
speech in ordinary workplaces

Within ordinary workplaces, should harassing statements
that touch on matters of public concern merit special treatment?
The fact that speech addresses matters of public concern does
not itself insulate it from common law dignitary torts. Gertz
154and Dun & Bradstreet 155 held exactly that: "[T]he fact that expression concerned a public issue did not by itself entitle the libel defendant to the constitutional protections of New York
Times." 156 New York Times represents "an accommodation between [First Amendment] [concerns] and the limited state interest present in the context of libel actions brought by public persons."157 The state has a stronger interest in redressing private
individuals' reputational harm, in gart because they have not entered the fray of public discourse. 1 8
152. Id. at 694-95.
153. Id. at 694, 724-27 ("[T]he Constitution should guard against the law's suppression of employee voice on workplace issues.").
154. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,343, 348-49 (1974).
155. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 756 (1985)
(citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343).
156. ld. at 756.
157. Id. ("[W]e found [in Gertz] that the state possessed a 'strong and legitimate ...
interest in compensating private individuals for injury to reputation."').
158. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344 ("[T]here is a compelling normative consideration underlying the distinction between public and private defamation plaintiffs. An individual who
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A kind of cost-benefit analysis underlies First Amendment
dignitary tort cases. Speech about public officials or figures receives the highest level of protection because the ability to express opinions about such persons and their affairs is the essence
of self-government. To deter as little of this expression as possible, the First Amendment requires public officials and figures to
endure injuries from defamation or infliction of emotional distress, unless the defendant acted with actual malice. 159
When expression about matters of public concern injures or
defames a private person, the First Amendment permits recovery if the defendant was negligent about a statement's truth. 160
The First Amendment does not require private persons to bear
as much of the cost of expression, and it imposes a greater responsibility on defendants to verify their statements. The implicit cost-benefit calculus is obvious: We can generally talk
about politics and current affairs without discussing a private individual who cannot respond to criticism as easily as public figures. The First Amendment therefore permits private individuals to recover more readily for their injuries and requires
speakers to check their facts. Statements that have little to do
with public affairs and defame a private individual receive almost no First Amendment protection- the only restriction is
that the state may not impose strict liability. Here, too, costbenefit analysis is at work. Private gossip about private persons
has little connection to public discourse, and so permitting private individuals' recovery hardly impairs our ability to govern
ourselves.
In ordinary workplaces, how do these principles apply to
expression about matters of public concern that creates a hostile
work environment? The government's purpose in prohibiting
workplace harassment is to guarantee equal economic opportunity regardless of a person's membership in a protected class.
This equality interest is stronger (and has a firmer constitutional
basis) than the more general interest in protecting people from
torts to personality. For several reasons discussed here, expression in ordinary workplaces also has an attenuated connection to
public discourse. Much workplace expression is instrumental to
decides to seek governmental office must accept certain necessary consequences of that
involvement in public affairs."').
!59. Sec id. at 342 (observing that the actual malice standard "exacts a ... high price
from the victims of defamatory falsehood" who will often "be unable to surmount" it).
160. !d. at 347. If the defamatory statement expressed an opinion and is not capable
of being falsified, however, a private person cannot recover. Cf. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1990).
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ends having nothing to do with First Amendment values, and
most people work for reasons unrelated to public discourse.
Even when workplace expression is about matters of public
concern, the workplace context often means that speakers and
listeners relate to each other very differently than they do in
public. Workplace expression is more likely to be face-to-face or
in small groups. It is harder to avoid, and workers often have
ongoing relationships that require them to get along. These features make workplace expression resemble regulable utterances
(like threats or fighting words) more than street-corner debates
and letters to the editor. Remember, too, that a slip of the lip
does not a federal case make. Hostile work environment liability
punishes only that small subset of workplace expression that is
so abusive that it transforms some protected characteristic of the
plaintiff into a cost of employment, thereby creating a hostile
work environment. 161
Even when expression does concern matters of public interest, hostile work environment liability is consistent with current
First Amendment doctrine. Governmental interests in protecting the dignity or personality of individuals or their privacy interests may outweigh an individual's interest in expressing her
opinions freely when the expression occurs outside public discourse. Outside public discourse, government must be able to
"authoritatively. . . construe its own civility rules" because
"[t]hese rules are deeply important to the maintenance of community identity." 162
6.

Hostile work environment liability for expression
in ordinary workplaces does not threaten First
Amendment values

Work's instrumental nature, its dependence on behavioral
norms, employees' economic dependence on work, and the inevitable constraints on workers' interactions mean that expression at most workplaces differs from expression in the public
square. Sometimes the work context gives expression a different
meaning than it would have in the public square. Sometimes expression is more threatening in the workplace. Sometimes expression impedes a coworker's progress or excludes a worker
from work teams.

161.
162.

Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,21 (1993).
Post, 103 Harv. L. Rev. at 665 (cited in note 97).
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Because of the relationship of speech to the economic and
instrumental aspects of work, the Supreme Court has allowed
expression in the workplace to be regulated more freely than
expression in public discourse. Thus, government cannot legitimately regulate speech in the public square on the ground that it
has the potential to disrupt, unsettle, or agitate an audience, except in the very narrow case of incitement. In contrast, the Court
has held in a variety of work contexts that government can, consistent with the First Amendment, regulate speech that disrupts
the workplace or interferes with work. In ordinary workplaces,
at least, liability for expression that creates a hostile work environment poses no threat to First Amendment values. Communicative workplaces are another story. I turn to that now.
D. THE EXPRESSIVE WORKPLACE, PUBLIC DISCOURSE, AND
THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTEXT

Every public accommodation is someone's workplace. 163 Interactions among patrons of a public accommodation could
therefore be described as occurring "in" a workplace. Eugene
Volokh worries that robust protection against hostile work environments will erode freedom of speech in places people generally use for debate and discussion. Professor Volokh's concerns
seem particularly reasonable if employers can be liable for failing to protect their employees from harassment by third parties.
It is true that most, if not all, public accommodations and
public fora are workplaces. It is not true that all workplaces are
fora. Nor is it true that all workplaces are situated the same way
relative to protected expression. To see this point, compare the
facts in Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards to a museum security
guard's objection to Playboy centerfolds displayed in the "Imagining the Body-1950 to 2000" exhibit. Can the museum guard
sue for harassment because she has to look at these crude centerfolds all day long and listen to stupid, sexist, and lewd comments by patrons? Can she force the art museum to cease the
exhibition or to monitor its patrons' comments for offensiveness?
Even if the centerfolds are exactly the same, the museum
has a significantly stronger First Amendment defense than the
shipyard. 164 Quite simply, the exhibition creates and facilitates
163. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Cyberspace, Harassment Law, and the
Clinton Administration, 63 L. & Contemp. Probs. 299,325 (2000).
164. See, e.g., Brooklyn Ins£. of Arts & Scis. v. City of New York, 64 F. Supp. 2d 184,
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public discourse in a way that the porn posted at the shipyard
does not. The museum invites members of the public to its exhibit to engage the images critically. The shipyard does not. Furthermore, without security guards, the museum cannot hold exhibitions. To protect the dignitary interest of someone in the
museum guard's position would neuter public discourse because
such a person is necessary to the production of public discourse.
A museum simply could not function as an art museum if
guards' harassment suits were sustained. The normative significance of the museum in public discourse implies rejection of
such suits. That normative significance may be so obvious that
we expect security guard applicants to know what they are getting into. But "assumption of risk" is just one inexact way of stating the normative inquiry, and it proves too much. A guard cannot sue, but a shipyard worker can-even she had been warned
that her workplace would be spiced with porn. 165
The problem with hostile work environment suits over museum exhibits is quite simple. An art museum could not function
as a center for public discourse if it feared these suits based on
its exhibits. Imagine a museum trying to vet the inoffensiveness
of its displays. Not only would it be impossible-in a large and
diverse workforce, someone could object to nearly any art object-but such vetting would undermine the very purpose of a
museum. At their best, museums expand visitors' knowledge, introduce visitors to new things and experiences-sometimes
beautiful, sometimes uncomfortable-and challenge visitors'
complacency. A museum that had to stage exhibitions in the
shadow of potential liability to its employees could mount only
the most banal exhibits of Impressionist landscapes-even Renoir nudes would be out. To preserve museums as places for
public discourse, therefore, a guard must suspend civility norms
relative to exhibits just as any other viewer must. 166
205 (E.D. N.Y. 1999) (granting an art museum's motion for preliminary injunction on
First Amendment grounds against New York City's attempts to cancel the museum's
public funding and its building lease because of the "Sensation" exhibit, which featured
the painting "The Holy Virgin Mary," on which the artist had smeared elephant dung);
Cuban Museum of Arts & Culture, Inc. v. City of Miami, 766 F. Supp. 1121 (S.D. Fla.
1991) (granting the museum's motion for a permanent injunction against the city on First
Amendment grounds; the city had sought to evict the museum from a city building unless
the museum stopped exhibiting works by artists who had not renounced the Castro regime).
165. Sec, e.g., Petrosky v. N.Y. State DMV, 72 F. Supp. 2d 39, 58-59 (N.D.N. Y. 1999)
(denying the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's hostile work environment claim
though the plaintiff had been warned when she began work that other workers used vulgar and lewd language).
166. The security guard has some other options to engage the exhibit critically. She
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If the museum guard's suit must fail for First Amendment
reasons, does the shipyard worker's fail, too? No.
Superficially both involve the same "expression," but the
cases could not be more different. The shipyard is not open to
the public. Few people-employees, invited business guests
(such as suppliers and special customers) and government inspectors-will see the extensive porn exhibit. The shipyard admits employees and business guests for business-related reasons.
Federal regulations require the shipyard to admit government
inspectors. None come specifically to see the porn. The shipyard,
in other words, is not a public accommodation. Those who display the porn do not have a dialogic relationship with those who
see the pictures, and they did not post the porn to spark discussions about it. The "display" of pornography at the shipyard is
just not part of public discourse. Nor does the shipyard produce
public discourse. Enforcing civility norms at the shipyard does
not interfere with ship building or with public discourse. Nothing
about the shipyard's mission or its relationships with its business
invitees cloaks them with political, and therefore First Amendment, significance.
Consider a factual variation: A librarian objects to patrons
who regularly surf Internet porn sites on library computers. She
can clearly see these images from her reference desk. She also
cleans out forgotten printouts from the printer bins. More and
more, she finds obscene printouts, which thanks to fancy printers, are in vivid Technicolor. She demands that the library install
Internet filters to stop patrons from looking at porn. The available filters cannot block only obscene images and may also block
sites with debates about pornography. Facts like these gave rise
to a hostile work environment claim filed with the EEOC by librarians at the Minneapolis Public Library. The EEOC ruled
that the library administration was liable for the hostile work
environment caused by the patrons. 167

can visit the museum and view the exhibit on her own time. She can start a debate about
the centerfolds-whether they arc an appropriate subject for an art exhibit, whether the
museum exhibit subverts or reenforces the images' subjugation of women, or whether
viewers should take the exhibit ironically or seriously. She could also hand out lliers proclaiming her criticisms about the exhibit and the effect it has on society's views of
women.
!67. See Steve Brandt, EEOC: Library Internet Porn Created Hostile Environment
84 Mpls. Star Tribune (May 25, 2001); see also Kevin Diaz, Odd Alliances, New Foes in
Minneapolis Porn Case, Mpls. Star Tribune A1 (June 5, 2001) (stating that the May 24,
2001 preliminary ruling by the EEOC recommended a settlement of $75,000 for each
employee).
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This case is different from and harder than O'Shea and
Robinson. In part, it's harder because the librarian does not
work with the patrons. By contrast, the plaintiffs in Robinson
and O'Shea had to work with the people who were displaying
porn or denegrating women. The patrons frequent the librarian's
workplace, but her job does not depend on their cooperation. It
is also harder because libraries are places where people seek information and entertainment, and we think they should do so
freely and anonymously. Indeed, federal laws guarantee the privacy of library patrons when they borrow books. The library
probably carries Penthouse, Playboy, The Joy of Sex, and books
on sexual fetishes. Presumably patrons check out those materials
and read them in the library without upsetting librarians. If the
librarians were upset, that would hardly justify stopping those
subscriptions or acquisitions. If the librarians complain because
they see the pictures over the patrons' shoulders or when they
pick up forgotten printouts, that complaint resembles the museum security guard's. The hostile work environment cause of
action would encroach upon public discourse by forcing the library to block access to web sites containing protected speech.
The Minneapolis Library case involved more, though. The
library told the librarians to enforce time limits on Internet terminals to ensure that all who wanted to use them could. Patrons
looking at porn sites balked. Often, librarians had to ask patrons
directly to relinquish the terminals. When they did so, patrons
often met the requests with abuse. 168 Patrons yelled, threatened,
cursed, and spat at the librarians. One patron even threw a
chair. 169 Some patrons also masturbated while web-surfing; others were obviously sexually aroused when librarians asked them
to relinquish the computer. 170 These facts turn an "environmental harassment" case based on arguably protected speech
into a case of one-on-one insults, invective, and physical threats
beyond the First Amendment's purview. Although the library
knew about these frightening and disturbing incidents, it appar168. Sec James Rosen, Push to Block Internet Porn Picks up Steam; Libraries,
Schools that Don't Shield Kids Could Lose Funding, Mpls. Star Tribune A1, A9 (July 17,
2000).

169. See Paul Levy, Library Limits Porn Access Via the Internet, Mpls. Star Tribune
Al, A16 (May 6, 2000).
170. See Rosen, Push to Block Internet Porn Picks up Steam; Libraries, Schools that
Don't Shield Kids Could Lose Funding at A9 (cited in note 168); see also Levy, Library
Limits Porn Access Via the Internet at Al6 (cited in note 169) (describing an incident involving a library employee who had to remind patrons that masturbation was not allowed in the library).
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ently did nothing to protect the librarians or to stop the abuse. 171
Holding the library liable for failing to protect its librarians from
verbal and physical abuse presents no real First Amendment
problem.
A problem does arise, however, if the only way to stop the
patrons from bullying the librarians is to block access to porn
sites because the library concludes that access to these materials
is causing the patrons to act abusively. Whether the library could
be required, consistent with the First Amendment, to impose filters to block access to pornography is a difficult question. Two
district courts have held that libraries cannot. 172 Libraries are
public fora, both courts concluded, and less restrictive means exist to protect children and librarians from pornography. Even
though one of these decisions dealt with the Children's Internet
Protection Act, not with workplace harassment, its observations
are particularly relevant:
[The] proper method for a library to deter unlawful or inappropriate patron conduct, such as harassment or assault of
other patrons, is to impose sanctions on such conduct, such as
either removing the patron from the library, revoking the patron's library privileges, or, in the appropriate case, calling the
. 173
po IIce.
It should also worry us that a First Amendment principle that al-

lowed libraries to use Internet filters to protect librarians from
violently aroused patrons would also seemingly justify suppressing certain books-Franz Fanon's The Wretched of the Earth
comes to mind-if patrons routinely became violently aroused
upon reading them in the library.
The social context of expression determines whether we encounter the expression as "speech" in the First Amendment
sense or as utterances that may be regulated. If expression happens in a context in which our interactions with others are primarily instrumental-ordinary workplaces-we are likely to see
171. Sec Levy, Library Limits Porn Access Via the Internet at A1 (cited in note 169)
(reporting that complaints were lodged with the Minneapolis Public Library during the
two years before the filing of the complaint, without action; only when the complaint was
filed did the library create an InteRlet policy to abate the abuse).
172. American Library Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9537 (E.D.
Pa. May 31, 2002) (striking on First Amendment grounds the Children's Internet Protection Act requirement that federally funded public libraries use Internet filters that exclude access to pornographic web sites); Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trustees of Library, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552, 570 (E.D. Va. 1998) (permanently enjoining on First
Amendment grounds the library's policy of requiring use of internet filters).
173. American Library, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9537 at *211.
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that expression as more conduct-like, even if in different context
we have no doubt that the expression is speech. In other arenas
that foster, support, and encourage debate, discussion, and the
expression of a plurality of opinions (such as an art museum or a
library), we might come to a different conclusion.
It is telling that we would not dispute restricting Internet
access if elementary school students were using school computers to surf porn sites. 174 Change the elementary school library
to a university library, and we have much hand-wringing. 175 If a
high school, however, wanted to block Internet access to porn,
we would feel uncomfortable about it, but the regulation would
likely be upheld. 176 These examples demonstrate how the scope
of regulation allowed by the First Amendment varies according
to the purpose of the institution. Elementary schools inculcate
values in young children; universities should challenge those
values and expand students' world-views; 177 high schools fall
somewhere in the middle.
As with schools, so with workplaces. Whether an institution
is educational or commercial, its mission and its relationship to
public discourse matter. In ordinary workplaces, where much
expression is instrumental to achieving ends having little to do
with the First Amendment, government may regulate a broad
174. Cf. Bd. of Ed. v. Pica, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality opinion favoring greater
rights of access to books for junior high and high school students).
175. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) ('To impose any strait
jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation .... Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to
study and to evaluate, ... otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die."); Papish v. Bd.
of Curators of Univ. of Missouri, 410 U.S. 667, 671 (1973) (striking University of Missouri's decision to a expel student because of the publication of a political cartoon that
depicted a police officer raping the Statue of Liberty and holding that "the First
Amendment leaves no room for the operation of a dual standard in the academic community with respect to the content of speech").
176. The Court has usually upheld restrictions on the speech of high school students
if the speech concerned sex, though these decisions have sparked angry dissents. See Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (upholding the suspension of a high school
student for making a sexually suggestive speech at a school event); Hazelwood Sch. Dist
v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266, 272 (1988) (upholding a school's decision to ban articles
on teen pregnancy in the school newspaper because a school may "disassociate itself ...
from [vulgar and indecent] speech" that would interfere with its work of teaching students "cultural values ... and helping [students] to adjwst normally to [a cultural] environment") (quotations and citations omitted). On the other hand, the Court has usually
struck down politically motivated restrictions on student speech. See Bd of Ed v. Pica,
457 U.S. 853 (1982) (fractured Court striking down a school district's removal of books
based on the district's political disagreement with the books' contents).
177. Indeed, the Court generally equates college newspapers with their adult counterparts. Sec, e.g., Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978); Papish v. Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Missouri, 410 U.S. 667,671 (1973).
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swath of expression. In expressive workplaces that foster, support, and encourage debate, discussion, and plural opinions, the
First Amendment insulates much more.
II. WHAT CHILL?
COMPARING HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT
SUITS WITH DIGNITARY TORTS
The free-speech critique condemns the hostile work environment cause of action as irremediably and unconstitutionally
vague. 178 As explained above, the hostile work environment
cause of action inquires whether harassing conduct is so severe
and pervasive that it alters the terms and conditions of the plaintiff's employment by creating objectively and subjectively abusive working conditions. 179 Professor Volokh accuses this standard of telling employers nearly nothing about their legal
obligations. 18° Courts assess harassment case by case. In the face
of this legal uncertainty, he argues, smart employers will clamp
down on speech within the workplace, disciplining workers for
discussing politics, religion, and current affairs, or for putting up
posters about those topics. 181 Critics argue that environmental
harassment, as distinguished from face-to-face harassment,
should not be actionable, 182 because environmental cases represent most of the situations that implicate protected speech. 183
Professor Volokh has catalogued many worrisome hostile work
environment complaints. He recounts that workers have charged
that pictures of the Ayatollah Khomeini tacked on the wall of a
coworker's cubicle and coworkers' discussions about Christianity
amount to religious harassment; others have claimed that overheard iokes about sex create sexually hostile work environments.r84
178. Eugene Volokh, What Speech Does 'Hostile Work Environment' Harassment
Law Restrict?, 85 Georgetown. L.J. 627, 634-36 (1997); Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as
Censorship: Hostile-Environment Harassment and the First Amendment, 52 Ohio St. L.J.
481,501-03 (1991).
179. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
180. Volokh, 85 Georgetown L.J. at 636 (cited in note 178); Browne, 52 Ohio St. L.J.
at 483 (cited in note 178) ("[T]he vagueness of the definition of 'harassment' leaves those
subject to regulation without clear notice of what is permitted and what is forbidden").
181. Volokh, 85 Georgetown L.J. at 636 (cited in note 178).
182. Volokh, 39 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 1843-47 (cited in note 28); cf. Estlund, 75 Tex.
L. Rev. at 750 (cited in note 128) (arguing that harassment that is not face-to-face should
only be actionable if it is "manifestly and grossly offensive" and cannot be avoided by
workers).
183. Volokh, 39 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 1843-47 (cited in note 28).
184. Volokh, 85 Georgetown L.J. at 631-32 (cited in note 178).
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A. THE REPORTS OF TITLE VII'S BREADTH ARE GREATLY
EXAGGERATED

These charges appear damning. And they would be, except
for a few stubborn facts. There are few (if any) actual cases that
have allowed complaints based on overheard comments or jokes
or displayed images to proceed to trial, and few cases in which
complaints based on comments or discussions about current affairs, religion, or politics (broadly construed) have made it past
summary judgment. Indeed, on close examination, most of the
cases Professor Volokh cites are far less troubling than he suggests. Some of the cases dismissed the plaintiff's claims. 185 Others involve facts far more serious than Professor Volokh's
descriptions suggest. 186 Another case pre-dates the Court's
decision in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., which would have
185. In the case involving the picture of the Ayatollah Khomeini, the plaintiff did
not sue for harassment, and the court dismissed the plaintiff's claim that she was fired
because of her national origin. See Pakiezegi v. First Nat'/ Bank of Boston, 831 F. Supp.
901 (D. Mass. 1993). The court found that a coworker's posting of the Ayatollah's picture
did not support the plaintiff's claim that her employer harbored anti· Iranian feelings; the
court observed that the fact that the employer had the picture removed supported the
opposite conclusion. ld. at 909. The court in Tunis v. Corning Glass Works, 747 F. Supp.
951 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), dismissed the plaintiffs hostile work environment and gender dis·
crimination claims, which were based on her coworkers' posting of a few nude photos
and their use of gender-specific job titles. Id. at 958-59. The court did mention that the
use of gender specific job titles could be discriminatory because such titles could give the
impression that the jobs were closed to women. Id. at 959. But contrary to Professor Volokh's claim (see Volokh, 85 Georgetown L.J. at 631 (cited in note 178)), the court did
not say-even in dictum-that the use of such titles could amount to harassment. Finally,
Bowman v. Heller, 420 Mass. 517 (Mass. S. Jud. Ct. 1995), which Professor Volokh de·
scribes as a harassment suit based on political speech (see Eugene Volokh, Freedom of
Speech and Appellate Review in Workplace Harassment Cases, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1009,
1014 n.20 (1996)), is far more speech-friendly than he admits. In this case, a woman ran
against the president of her union. One of the incumbent's supporters circulated a pic·
ture to a few of his friends that superimposed the plaintiffs face on photos of nude
women masturbating. (Predictably, these friends circulated it more widely.) The plaintiff
sued for sexual harassment and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Professor Volokh does not mention that the appellate court vacated the trial court's finding of sexual
harassment. 420 Mass. at 519 n.4. Nor docs he mention the appellate court's careful
analysis of the First Amendment issues raised by the plaintiffs emotional distress claim.
The court specifically found that the plaintiff was not a limited public figure and that the
photo was not about a matter of public concern. Id. at 525-26.
186. For example, two harassment cases Professor Volokh describes as being reli·
gious environmental harassment cases were actually cases in which the plaintiffs were
themselves insulted and demeaned based on their religion. In Turner v. Barr, 806 F.
Supp. 1025 (D.D.C. 1992), a white, Jewish Deputy U.S. Marshal claimed his suspension
from duty for a prisoner's escape was actually racial and religious harassment because no
African American marshals had been suspended for prisoners' escapes. Id. at 1028-29.
He also claimed that he was insulted on several occasions because of his race and religion: he was told he would be better at handling money and working in the jewelry business than being a marshal; on other occasions, his African American coworkers called
him a "white ass" and told him to get his "white-ass" out of the office because it was "a
black office, for blacks, supervised by blacks." ld. at 1028. In Peck v. Sony Music Corp.,
1995 WL 505653 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 1995), the plaintiff claimed that her coworker
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in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., which would have precluded
its claims. 187 Another is a retaliation case in which the court observes that the conduct about which the plaintiff complained
would not state a claim for harassment. 188
I reviewed more than three hundred electronically reported
district court rulings in hostile work environment cases from
January 1999 to November 2001. 189 Few (if any) cases involved
any expression that could be characterized as remotely political.
And none survived defendants' motions for summary judgment.
Indeed, most cases based on "environmental harassment" overheard dirty or racist jokes, sexual banter, or sexist or racist
remarks-are dismissed at or before summary judgment. Courts
routinely find, as a matter of law, that a reasonable person would
not find overheard comments to be hostile or abusive enough to
alter a plaintiff's working conditions if the plaintiff is not actually
their subject. 19°For example, one court dismissed a complaint by
a car-saleswoman who alleged that her dealership created a hostile work environment when it held a weekend-long sales promotion featuring scantily clad women lounging in a hot-tub. The
environmental harassment claims that have progressed past
summary judgment generally have involved the widespread display of pornography, pornographic cartoons, and sexually explicit graffiti-Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards is the paradigmatic example.

"screamed" at her on many occasions that she would go to hell if she did not repent. Id.
at *2. He also told her wr ekly that she was a sinner and had to repent. Id. When she apparently did not repent, this coworker held a prayer meeting with another coworker at
the plaintiffs desk to urge her to repent. Id.
187. Had the court in Brown Transport Corp. v. Penn. Human Relations Comm'n,
133 Pa. Cmwlth. 545 (1990), applied Harris's holding that harassment must be "severe or
pervasive" enough "to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an
abusive working environment," it should have dismissed the plaintiffs complaint. The
court found that the bible verses on the plaintiffs pay stubs and religious editorials in the
company newsletter never "hinder[ed] [the plaintiffs] job performance." Id. at 557.
188. In Carlson v. Dalton, 1994 WL 735488 (EEOC Apr. 26, 1994), the plaintiff
claimed that she was retaliated against because she complained about a prayer session
held in her department at the Naval Supply Center. This EEOC opinion did not address
the merits of the claim but whether the plaintiffs complaint could proceed after she had
rejected a settlement offer. The opinion specifically stated that "nothing in this decision
is intended to suggest that a one-time offer of a prayer at work .. would rise to the level
of hostile environment harassment." !d. at *6.
189. I drew my universe of cases from a "key search" I performed on Westlaw in
November 2001. As my key terms, I selected first "employment law," then "discrimination," and then "harassment." On the "search page," I selected "US district court" cases.
I then entered "sy,di(harassment) & date(>1998)" as my search terms.
190. Temple v. Auto Bane of Kan., Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1130 (D. Kan. 1999).
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My review also revealed only two possible cases of "environmental harassment" that survived defendants' motions for
summary judgment between 1998 and 2001. In Underwood v.
Northport Health Services, Inc., 191 a white plaintiff was ridiculed
by African American coworkers and subordinates and falsely
accused of being racist. Her employer ultimately demoted her
because she had poor relationships with her coworkers. The
court denied the employer summary judgment because the racial
ridicule undermined the plaintiff's work and paved the way for
her demotion. The plaintiff in LaRocca v. Precision Motorcars,
Inc. 192 claimed that his coworkers created a hostile work environment by denigrating his and others' national origin. The
court denied the employer's summary judgment motion because
the plaintiff was himself repeatedly insulted. These cases arguably involved "direct" harassment, to use Professor Volokh's
terminology, not "environmental" harassment, because the
plaintiff was the subject of the "overheard" remarks. In the vast
majority of the cases I reviewed, when a plaintiff complained of
verbal harassment, district courts granted summary judgment for
defendants, unless the plaintiff was also the victim of offensive
touching or fondling or the subject of a pattern of frequent, targeted, and repeated insults and verbal abuse. 193
For the sake of argument, assume, as Professor Volokh
does, that each individual photograph, cartoon, or scrawl at the
Jacksonville Shipyard would ordinarily be protected by the First
Amendment. The government, it is true, generally cannot ban or
suppress the creation, distribution, display, or viewing of pornography unless it is obscene. 194 Even so, a hostile work environment claim based on the pervasive display of pornographic
pictures, cartoons, and graffiti does not necessarily create a First
Amendment problem.
As an initial matter, offense is not harassment. One pornographic image or an off-color joke does not by itself create a hostile work environment. Harassment must be pervasive or severe
to be actionable. To be severe or pervasive, harassment must be
frequent, humiliating, physically threatening, or serious enough
191. 57 F. Supp. 2d 1289 (M.D. Ala. 1999).
192. 45 F. Supp. 2d 762 (D. Neb. 1999).
193. Sec, e.g., Franklin v. King Lincoln-Mercury-Suzuki, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 2d 661 (D.
Md. 1999) (denying summary judgment for defendant on plaintiffs hostile work environment claim because the plaintiff was nicknamed "M&M" (for "mental masturbation"), subjected to lewd remarks ("why order out when you can have fresh meat here?'')
and sexual gestures).
194. Sable Communication. of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
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that it actually interferes with someone's ability to do work. 195
Harris v. Forklift squarely holds that: A "mere utterance of
an ... epithet which engenders offensive feelings in a employee
does not sufficient~ affect the conditions of employment to implicate Title VII." 1 6 The Court expanded this point in Faragher
v. City o~ Boca Raton 197 and Clark County School District v.
Breeden. 98 "A recurring point in [the Court's harassment] opinions is that simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the 'terms and conditions of employment.",~ 99
It is true that in the harassment context, some courts have
held that a supervisor can create an abusive work environment if
he calls a subordinate a "n- -r." 20° Courts facing such fact patterns have not ruled uniformly, however. Courts have been significantly less likely to hold that coworkers have created hostile
and abusive work environments when they have called a fellow
worker the same epithet or when the epithet was not directed at
the plaintiff. 201 Those cases that confront analogous genderspecific epithets suggest that "n- -r" is the sole exception that
proves the general rule. In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton/ 02 the
I 95. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,23 (1993).
I 96. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22. Last year the Court reaffirmed this point in Clark
County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001) (per curiam). In that case, Ms. Breeden
complained to her employer that her coworkers harassed her during a meeting with her
when they had laughed at a sexual insult that was recounted in a job applicant's file. After she complained, her employer proposed transferring her to an undesirable job, in retaliation, she claimed, for her complaint. Id. at 271-73. The Court held that the incident
could not create a hostile work environment, and that her belief that it was harassment
was so off-base that Title VII did not shield her from retaliation. Id. at 270-71.
197. 524 U.S. 775,788 (1998).
I 98. 532 U.S. 268 (2001) (per curiam).
I 99. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,788 (1998); Breeden, 532 U.S. 271.
200. I trust the reader can mentally fill in the ellipses. Sec, e.g., Rodgers v. WesternSouthern Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 675 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding that supervisor had created a hostile work environment by calling plaintiff "n- -r" on more than one occasion
because "no single act can more quickly alter the conditions of employment and create
an abusive working environment than the usc of an unambiguously racial epithet such as
'n- -r' by a supervisor in the presence of his subordinates") (ellipses added); Walker v.
Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355, 1358-59 (11th Cir. 1982) ("[U]se of the terms 'n--rrigged' and 'black-ass,' as well as other racially abusive language was 'repeated,' 'continuous,' and 'prolonged' despite [plaintiffs] objections, and that the language made
[plaintiff] feel unwanted and uncomfortable in his surroundings") (ellipses added); Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F.Supp. 923, 927 (N.D. Ill.1984) ("The use of the word 'n- -r' automatically separates the person addressed from every non-black person; this is discrimination per se") (ellipses added).
201. See, e.g. Eruanga v. Grafton Sch., Inc., 181 F. Supp. 2d 514, 523-24 (D. Md.
2002) (finding no hostile work environment when supervisors' use of word n--r was
reported to plaintiff by others and not directly heard by him).
202. 524 u.s. 775,788 (1998).

436

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 19:391

Supreme Court clarified that the hostile work environment did
not prohibit "the sporadic use of abusive language, genderrelated jokes, [or] occasional teasing." Such "isolated incidents"
do not create discriminatory "terms and conditions of employment."zo3
Second, holding a defendant liable for harm caused by an
entire course of conduct, though each isolated incident would
not create liability, is not unique to the hostile work environment cause of action. The same logic underlies intentional infliction of emotional distress claims: one insult almost never causes
legally cognizable anguish, but many such slurs can. 204 The First
Amendment does not bar these claims.
Critics might reply that the actual state of harassment law is
beside the point if employers actually do squelch protected expression out of a fear of Title VII liability. Professor Volokh has
documented that many employers zealously police their workplaces for offensive expression. It does not follow, however, that
the hostile work environment cause of action is unconstitutionally vague. The next section argues that Title VII provides sufficient guidance to employers and is not unconstitutionally vague.
It is possible that employers might over-regulate employees'
or patrons' expression out of an irrational fear of liability under
Title VII. But employer over-regulation is only a constitutional
concern if Title VII is itself unconstitutionally vague or overbroad; or if workplace expression is so crucial to public discourse
that a special rule to protect against erroneous hostile work environment judgments is necessary to ensure that all protected
speech is insulated from liability. The New York Times actual
malice requirement is this kind of rule, and it buffers speakers
and publishers against defamation suits by public officials and
figures. I will argue that such a rule might be appropriate in expressive workplaces to insulate them from environmental harassment claims based on patrons' expression or the overall mission of the workplace itself. Additionally, the likelihood that an
employer will over-regulate expression in the workplace will
vary depending on a workplace's mission. In workplaces that are
most connected to public discourse-expressive workplaces and
203. Id.; see also Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993) (holding that a
"mere offensive utterance" is not severe or pervasive harassment).
204. Sec McLure v. Tiller, 63 S.W.3d 72, 82 (Tex. App. 2001) ("Although a single
act, taken alone, may or may not rise to the level of 'extreme and outrageous' conduct,
this Court has previously determined that it is possible that several acts taken together
can amount to such harassment as to be more than petty oppression").
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public accommodations such as restaurants, bars, and cafesemployers have the fewest incentives to check patrons' expression.
B. LEGAL UNCERTAINTY IS A FACf OF LIFE, EVEN UNDER
THE FIRST AMENDMENT

The threat of liability almost always encourages actors to
take steps to avoid it. Some employers wishing to avoid liability
for discrimination will limit their employees' expression, possibly
even more than the law requires, and perhaps because of uncertainty about what the law requires. If true, this fact does not itself make antidiscrimination laws unconstitutional. To argue that
uncertainty is unconstitutional, the free-speech attack has made
three false assumptions. First, the free-speech attack assumes
that the First Amendment always protects expression and always
protects it in the same way, without regard to context or content.
As we have seen, however, not all expression relates equally to
the First Amendment. Second, the free-speech attack also assumes that the First Amendment's concern with inhibiting expression is always the same regardless of the context in which
expression occurs. This, too, is wrong. The First Amendment is
far more worried about chilling effects in the arena of public discourse?05 Third, the free-speech attack has assumed that all employers would prefer to avoid the risk of hostile work environment liability by stifling expression in the workplace, autodealerships the same as bookstores and art galleries. This assumption is just silly.
1.

No one, not even The New York Times, is
spared from legal uncertainty

Legal uncertainty is a fact of life. The First Amendment
does not spare newspapers, museums, libraries, book publishers,
or speakers declaiming on public corners from legal uncertainty.206 Speakers, writers, and publishers face potential liability
every day, even when they are publishing stories that unquestionably address political matters. New York Times does not bar
liability; it permits public officials and figures to recover for
defamation if the defendant acted with "actual malice." "Actual
malice" test is a term of art for recklessness-the defendant
205. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53,55 (1988) (explaining that concerns
about chill arc particularly acute "in the area of public debate about public figures").
206. Post, Sexual Harassment and the First Amendment at 9 (cited in note 15).
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knew or should have known that a statement was false and published despite that knowledge. This is a difficult but not insurmountable test.
The "actual malice" standard does not apply to all cases.
Private persons may recover against newspapers for defamation,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, false-light, or public
disclosure of private facts, even if the newspaper was reporting
on matters of public concern. If newspapers and magazines can
publish and flourish in the face of potential liability, there is no
reason to expect that expressive workplaces (which may include
newspapers and magazines) would react differently to the (remote) possibility of hostile work environment liability.
Political speech is not completely immune from liability for
defamation or intentional infliction of emotional distress because the state has an interest in protecting personal reputations,
even though doing so may impinge on "s~eech." As the Court
explained in Milkovich v. Lorain Journae 0
The numerous decisions . . . establishing First Amendment
protection for defendants in defamation actions surely demonstrate the Court's recognition of the Amendment's vital
guarantee of free and uninhibited discussion of public issues.
But there is also another side to the equation; we have regularly acknowledged the 'important social values which underlie the law of defamation,' and recognized that '[s]ociety has a
pervasive and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation.' ... 'The right of a man to the protection of his own reputation from unjustified invasion and
wrongful hurt reflects no more than our basic concept of the
essential dignity and worth of every human being- a concept
208
at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.'

New York Times and Hustler do not ban dignitary tort suits
to save protected speech. Rather, they simply elevate the
threshold for liability to shift the risk, or cost, of error involved
in publishing potentially defamatory or otherwise tortious material from the media to the defamed person. 209 At common law,
defamation was a strict liability tort; after these decisions recovery for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress must satisfy a higher, constitutionally mandated standard
for liability.
207.
208.
209.

497 u.s. 1 (1990).
Id. at 22-23.
Sec Schauer, 92 Col urn. L. Rev. at 1321-23 (cited in note 67).
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The legal standards for hostile work environment provide appropriate "breathing room"
for expression in ordinary workplaces

Hostile work environment doctrine incorporates "breathing
room" for employee and employer speech in a couple of ways
that are similar to defamation's actual malice test. First, the
standard for finding actionable harassment is relatively high. A
plaintiff flattened by one callous or crude remark by a supervisor
or coworker will not prevail. 210 Harassment must be not only offensive, but severe, repeated, and pervasive before a court will
impose liability. Second, a plaintiff must also prove that an employer is liable for the harassment. Employers are vicariously liable only for harassment by supervisors. Even then, they may escape liability if they provided adequate channels for reporting
and remedying harassment, and the plaintiff unreasonably failed
to avail herself of these opportunities.m
Establishing employer liability for "environmental harassment" and harassment by coworkers and third parties is significantly more difficult. This fact is significant because critics have
identified "environmental harassment" and harassment by coworkers and third parties as presenting the greatest risk to free
speech. 212 The standard for employer liability in these cases is
negligence-that the employer knew or should have known of
the harassment and failed to take appropriate corrective action.213 Put differently, "a victim of coworker harassment must
show either actual knowledge on the part of the employer or
conduct sufficiently severe and pervasive as to constitute constructive knowledge to the employer. " 214
In practice, courts require the plaintiff to notify the employer that she believes she is being harassed on the basis of sex
or some other protected characteristic; notifying an employer
that another coworker is generally harassing her is not
enough. 215 Absent notification, courts will find constructive
knowledge only if harassment is public and constant, or if the
acts of harassment are "so egregious, numerous, and concen210. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993) (an offensive epithet is not
enough).
211. Eller1h, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher v. Boca Rawn, 524 U.S. 775, 804-08 (1998).
212. Vo1okh, 39 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 1845-47 (cited in note 28); Vo1okh, 85 Georgetown L.J. at 635-36 (cited in note 178).
2!3. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759.
214. Miller v. Ken worth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F. 3d 1269, 1278 (11th Cir. 2002).
215. See, e.g., McGuire v. Kansas, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12973, *16-17 (D. Kan.
2001).
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trated" that they amount to a "a campaign." 216 Occasionally, an
employer may have constructive notice if it knows that a particular employee has repeatedly and seriously harassed others before.21
A negligence standard for employer liability does falls short
of the "actual malice" or recklessness standard of New York
Times and Falwell. It is, however, not without fault. Also, in
practice, courts tend to use more of a "negligence plus" standard, often refusing to find that the employer liable unless the
complainant actually reported the harassment. 218
The effect of New York Times' recklessness standard is to
"protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters."219 Applied to hostile work environment actions, such a
standard would shield expression that would otherwise be severe
and pervasive harassment to protect expression that matters. It
has no place in ordinary workplaces. New York Times extends its
special protection to select expression about ~ublic officials and
figures within the realm of public discourse. 22 But, as I have argued in Part I, expression in ordinary workplaces rarely if ever
resembles expression within the realm of public discourse, where
freewheeling debate is the ideal and the cure for offense is giving
as good as you get. Communication among workers occurs
among private persons, not public figures, and against the backdrop of numerous restraints and civility norms-workers depend
on one another and continuously interact in close quarters.
We should also remember that the government has a compelling interest in ensuring equal employment opportunities irrespective of race, sex, or national origin. Surely, if the government's interest in protecting private individuals from
reputational harm justifies a negligence standard for defamation
suits, the government's interest in workplace equality justifies
hostile work environment's similar liability standards. The gov-

216. Ford v. West, 222 F. 3d 767, 777 (lOth Cir. 2000); Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
144 F.3d 664, 675 (lOth Cir.1998); Baker v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 903 F.2d 1342, 1346 (lOth
Cir. 1990); Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417, 1422 (7th Cir. 1986).
217. Ciszewski v. Engineered Polymers Corp., 179 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1097-98 (D.
Minn. 2001); sec also Hirase·Doi v. U.S. West Communications, Inc., 61 F.3d 777, 784
(lOth Cir. 1995).
218. See, e.g., Rutledge v. Macy's E., Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18684 (D. Me.
2001) (finding that, based on the plaintiffs reports of sporadic harassment, the employer
could not have expected that further harassment would occur).
219. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,341 (1974).
220. !d. at 347-48.
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ernment's interest in workplace equality is at least as great as its
interest in protecting individual reputation.
Given these considerations, the actual malice standard's
preference for free speech over other interests would be out of
place in most workplaces. In ordinary workplaces, the hostile
work environment's negligence standard strikes the right balance between the government's interest in promoting equal employment opportunities and employer prerogatives to manage
workplaces and workforces. 221
3. Some expression in "communicative" workplaces deserves
additional protection from hostile work environment liability
Not all workplaces are ordinary workplaces. Some that I
have called "communicative" or "expressive" generate expression that contributes to public discourse (such as museum exhibits and newspapers) or facilitate the public discourse of their patrons (museums and libraries and perhaps restaurants).
Employee suits for environmental harassment based on an organization's or its patrons' expression could suppress a great
deal of public discourse. In these workplaces, the law should
protect some harassment "to protect speech that matters. " 222 If a
worker in an expressive workplace were to bring a hostile environment claim based on the theory that some expression linked
to public discourse-a picture in a gallery or a patron's gruesomely graphic discussion of the picture-New York Times' actual malice standard should apply. In effect, New York Times
and Falwell would entirely bar most, if not all, claims of harassment arising in this context, as they would be based on harassing
expressions of opinion, not false facts.

C. HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT'S
REASONABLE PERSON STANDARDS ARE NOT
UN CONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE, AND THEY
MIRROR THE ELEMENTS OF OTHER DIGNITARY
TORTS
Critics have argued that hostile work environment's "reasonable person" standard of abusiveness and its inquiry into a
plaintiff's subjective reactions are unacceptably vague. These ob221. Cf. Post, Sexual Harassment and the First Amendment at 620 (cited in note 15)
("(T]he value of equality presents stronger constitutional claims within the context of the
workplace than within the context of public discourse.").
222. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341.
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jections are groundless. These elements of a hostile work environment cause of action mirror those of other dignitary torts.
The cause of action for hostile work environment generates no
more legal uncertainty than do those torts.
Several contextual inquiries underlie the absence of malice
standard. Courts must determine whether a statement is defamatory, whether it is fact or opinion, and whether it is true or
false. 223 To determine whether a statement is defamatory, courts
ask whether statements in an article or speech, read "in context
and looking at the impression that they were likely to engender in
the minds of the_ aver,~?e reader" or listener, are "c~pa~le of a defamatory meamng. ,_ In other words, the question 1s whether
the statements "lower[] the ... reputation" of some individual
"in the eyes of the community," causing "others to avoid associating with" that person. 225 Courts evaluate potentially defamatory statements "in the light of what might reasonably have been
understood ... by the persons who [heard] it. " 226
Whether a potentially defamatory publication is fact or
opinion also matters. Statements of opinion sometimes receive
greater First Amendment protection. But the distinction between fact and opinion is not clear-cut. As with the inquiry into
an article's defamatory impact, the distinction between fact and
opinion turns on context and an ordinary reader's reactions.
Would a reader understand a statement to be the writer's opinion or a factual assertion? Whether a speaker or writer prefaced
a statement with "I think" does not complete the inquiry, as
Judge Henry Friendly once acidly observed. 227 Instead courts
223. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
224. E.g., Tucker v. Fischbein, 237 F.3d 275, 283 (3d Cir. 2001) (emphasis added)
(applying Pennsylvania defamation law); see also Cal. Civ. Code Ann. § 45 (West, 1982)
(providing that "[l]ibel is a false and unprivileged publication by writing ... which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be
shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation"); Masson v.
New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 510 (1991) (observing that under California
law "'[t]he test of libel is not quantitative; a single sentence may be the basis for an action
in libel even though buried in a much longer text,' though California courts recognize
that '[ w]bile a drop of poison may be lethal, weaker poisons are sometimes diluted to the
point of impotency"') (quoting Washburn v. Wright, 261 Cal. App. 2d 789, 795 (1968));
Bakal v. Weare, 583 A.2d 1028, 1029 (Me.l990) (explaining that under Maine law a
statement is defamatory "'if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him
in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing
with him"') (quoting Restatement (2d) Torts§ 559 (1977)).
225. Tucker, 237 F.3d at 283.
226. Marston v. Newavom, 629 A.2d 587,592 (Me. 1993) (quotations omitted).
227. "It would be destructive of the law of libel if a writer could escape liability for
accusations of [defamatory conduct] simply by using, explicitly or implicitly, the words 'I
think."' Cianci v. New Times Pub/. Co., 639 F.2d 54, 64 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoted in Milk-
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ask, among other questions, whether a speaker or writer employ
"loose, figurative, or hyperbolic language which would negate
the impression that [he] was seriously maintaining" a proposition?22 What was the general tenor of the article? Playful or
deadly serious?
The jury read as parody, not fact, Hustler's publication of
Jerry Falwell's "confession" that his mother had deflowered him
in the family outhouse and that he could preach the gospel only
when he was stone-drunk. The "interview" appeared in a selfproclaimed "ad-parody," with a small-print disclaimer that the
ad was not meant to be taken seriously. The farcically worded
"ad" also appeared in Hustler, a publication with which Falwell
was unlikely to interview. No one could have taken it seriously.
By contrast, the Court found the statements at issue in
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. to be largely factual. 229 Mike
Milkovich coached a high school wrestling team that was suspended from the state wrestling tournament by the state athletic
association for fighting with another team at a match. The wrestlers' parents sued to overturn the suspension, and Milkovich
testified in that suit. The Lorain Journal published a column implying that Milkovich had lied under oath. The columnist wrote
conversationally and used the first-person to report his impressions of Milkovich's testimony. The Court found that the gist of
the column gleaned from the column's caption and body was
that Milkovitch had '"lied at the hearing after ... having given
his solemn oath to tell the truth. "' 230 This accusation was a factual proposition-the writer did not use "the sort of loose, figurative, or hyperbolic language" that "would negate the impression" that Milkovich had perjured himself. 231 The implication
"that petitioner committed perjury is sufficiently factual to be
susceptible of being proved true or false. " 232 Whether Milkovich
perjured himself could be determined by examining "a core of
objective evidence"- Milkovich's "testimony before the [state
athletics 1 board [and] his subsequent testimony before the trial
court." 231

ovich v.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19 (1990)).
Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21.
Id. at 21-22.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 21.
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Determining the truth or falsity of defamatory statements
also requires contextual judgment. For example, when Clint
Eastwood sued the National Enquirer for touting its "interview"
with Clint Eastwood as "exclusive" when Eastwood had never
spoken to anyone at the Enquirer, the court took those facts as
the starting point for its analysis. 234 The Enquirer contended that
in the tabloid trade the phrase "exclusive interview" meant only
that the Enquirer was the sole American tabloid to run the interview, not that it had actually interviewed Eastwood. 235 The
court, however, found that the article's use of the "simple past
tense" ("Eastwood said") rather than the past perfect ("Eastwood has said") along with "scene-setting language" ("[Eastwood] said with a chuckle") "suggested that the writer," an Enquirer editor, "had conversed" with "the movie star." 236 The
court concluded:
We are not suggesting that any one of these things is dispositive (or, conversely, that the Enquirer would have solved the
problem with a single alteration). Rather, we look to the totality of the Enquirer's presentation of the interview and find
that the editors falsely suggested to the ordinary reader of
their publication-as well as those who merely glance at the
headlines while waiting at the supermarket checkout
counter-that Eastwood had willingly chatted with someone
. 237
f rom t he E nqULrer.

Here, too, the "ordinary reader's" reaction to all of the article's
contextual clues-the headline, the "exclusive" baby picture of
Eastwood's son that accompanied the article, and the verb tense
used to relate Eastwood's remarks-is the judicial benchmark.
Finally, when the plaintiff is a public figure or official, a defendant's liability turns on the presence of "actual malice""knowledge that [a statement] was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." 238 Sometimes tort liability
for statements concerning matters of public interest is also
evaluated under the actual malice standard. Who is a public fiRure239 and whether a statement is a matter of public concern °
are also fact- and context-based questions.
234. Eastwood v. Nat'/ Enquirer, Inc., 123 F.3d 1249, 1255-56 (9th Cir. 1997).
235. Id. at 1256.
236. Id. at 1250, 1256.
237. Id. at 1256 (emphasis added). See also Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.,
501 U.S. 496, 517 (1991) ("Minor inaccuracies do not amount to falsity so long as the substance, the gist, the sting, of the libelous charge be justified.").
238. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,279-280 (1964).
239. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974) (holding public figure
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Unsurprisingly, the inquiry into "malice" also requires contextual analysis- did "the author in fact entertain[] serious
doubts as to the truth of his publication or actiJ with a high degree of awareness of ... [its] probable falsity"? 1 Faced with the
seemingly simple case of quotation marks deliberately placed
around words the plaintiff never spoke, Masson v. New Yorker
Magazine rejected a per se finding of malice or recklessness:
[The] deliberate alteration of the words uttered by a plaintiff
does not equate with knowledge of falsity for purposes of
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc. unless the alteration results in a material change in the
meaning conveyed by the statement. The use of quotations to
attribute words not in fact spoken bears in a most important
242
way on that inquiry, but it is not dispositive in every case.

Instead the Court's inquiry proceeded in three steps. First,
would "a reasonable reader ... conclude that the quotation purports to be a verbatim repetition of a statement by the speaker"?
Second, did the quotation differ materially from what the person
actually said? Third, did the writer recklessly change the meaning of the quotations? 243
The Court dissected each quotation in Malcolm's New
Yorker article against Masson's remarks on tape, painstakingly
comparing the fair reading of Masson's tape-recorded statements
with Malcolm's quotations? 44 The Court analyzed, for example,
whether Malcolm's quotation that Masson planned to use the
Freud house for "sex, women, fun" differed substantially from
Masson's tape-recorded remarks that "he and another analyst
planned to have great parties at the Freud house and, in a context that may not even refer to Freud house activities, to 'pass
women on to each other"'; or whether Malcolm's quote that
Masson had changed his middle-name to Moussaieff because "it
sounded better" was "in context" materially different from Mas-

inquiry asks whether person has "assume[dj special prominence in the resolution of public questions").
240. Cf. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983) (holding in the government
employee speech context that "whether ... speech addresses a matter of public concern
must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed
by the whole record").
241. Masson, 501 U.S. at 510 (citations omitted).
242. Id. at 517 (citations omitted).
243. !d. at 519-20.
244. Id. at 522 (asking whether quotations "fairly read" differed materially from
tape-recorded remarks).
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son's tape-recorded explanation that he "just liked" the name
better. 24
The Court also scrutinized the particular factual circumstances surrounding Malcolm's drafting of the article and the
New Yorker's publication of it to determine whether there was
sufficient evidence for the jury to consider the issue of malice.
Noting that Malcolm had taped the interviews and that she was
not working under a "tight deadline," the Court concluded that
she had enough time to compare her quotes against the tapes for
accuracy.Z 46 She had also told her New Yorker editor that all of
the story's quotations came from the tapes, and a comparison of
her "typewritten notes, ... manuscript, [and] ... galler,s" tended
to show that she knew she was altering the quotations. 47
The factual and contextual issues underpinning a defamation case closely resemble those in hostile work environment
suits. Both causes of action rest on the reactions of a "reasonable" person. Defamation asks how a reasonable person would
have understood a statement and whether such a person's estimation of the plaintiff would drop. Hostile work environment
asks whether a reasonable person would find the work environment to be "hostile and abusive." 248 Both dissect the context in
which the statements were made. In defamation courts analyze
the publication in which the statement appears, 249 the context of
the statement within the story, and whether the statement would
be understood as ironic or as hyperbole. In hostile work environment cases, courts consider "all [of] the circumstances. " 250
Among many considerations, the court may analyze what a coworker or supervisor said or did to the plaintiff, whether the harasser was a supervisor or coworker, whether the comments
were frequent or sporadic, whether they were made jokingly or
with a threatening or humiliating tone, or whether they were
said in private or in front of other workers.

245. !d. at 523-24 (internal quotations omitted).
246. !d. at 521.
247. !d.
248. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993). Hostile work environment
additionally requires that the plaintiff subjectively finds her work environment to be hostile and abusive.
249. For example, someone reading a story in the New Yorker would probably understand quotation marks to designate the actual words of the person quoted. See, e.g.,
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 513 (1991). By contrast, someone
reading the National Enquirer likely takes quotation marks with a grain of salt. See, e.g.,
Eastwood v. National Enquirer, 123 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 1997).
250. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.
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In evaluating an employer's liability for harassment by a
plaintiff's coworkers, courts use a standard that parallels the
"absence of malice" standard for liability. Employer liability for
coworker harassment turns on whether the employer knew or
should have known that the plaintiff was being harassed and
whether the employer failed to take appropriate corrective action.251
Some commentators have argued that the hostile work environment cause of action is constitutionally suspect because it
depends on the "reactions of listeners" and therefore violates
the constitutional maxim against the "heckler's veto." This criticism is a non sequitur. The plaintiff's subjective reaction is an
additional element of the hostile work environment, not the
threshold. The threshold requirement is whether a reasonable
person would find the workplace hostile and abusive-just as a
statement is defamatory if it casts a person in disrepute in the
eyes of an average or reasonable reader. If a plaintiff subjectively perceives her workplace as hostile or abusive, her complaint will nevertheless fail if a reasonable person would not find
the workplace to be so. On the other hand, a plaintiff's complaint will fail if she cannot prove that she perceived her workplace to be hostile or abusive, even if it objectively is so.
Reliance on a "reasonable person" standard to determine
whether a work environment is hostile or abusive could be described as a "listener-reaction" standard. But the use of the "reasonable person" standard to determine hostile work environment is no different in this respect from defamation, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and other personality torts such
as public disclosure of private facts. 252 Each of these torts uses a
"reasonable" person or reader standard to determine offensiveness and the effect of a publication on a plaintiff's community
standing.
D. EMPLOYERS IN COMMUNICATIVE WORKPLACES AND IN
PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS HAVE FEW INCENTIVES TO
SQUELCH THEIR PATRONS' EXPRESSION

The previous sections demonstrate that Title VII's liability
standards are quite similar to the liability standards that govern
251. Burlington Indus .• Inc. v. E//erth, 524 U.S. 742,758-59 (1998).
252. See, e.g., Flowers v. Carville, 112 F. Supp.2d 1202 (D. Nev., 2000) (holding that
standard for recovery for public disclosure of private facts is whether "a public disclosure
of pnvate facts has occurred which would be offensive and objectionable to a reasonable
person of ordinary sensibilities") (quotations omitted).
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defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
There is no conceptual reason, therefore, that Title VII should
create a greater risk of chill than these reputational torts do.
There are practical reasons as well why employers in "expressive" or "communicative" workplaces are unlikely to overreact to the risk of Title VII liability. The argument that employers will censor workplace expression is straightforward:
Profit-maximizing employers see the risk of Title VII liability as
a cost to be avoided, and censoring workplace expression is a
cheap way to avoid liability. This argument, however, assumes
that all employers share the same inclinations to steer far clear
of Title VII liability by curbing expression in the workplace. But
that is not the case. Indeed, employers in workplaces with the
closest connection to public discourse have the weakest incentives to overreact to the threat of liability. Employers in "expressive workplaces" -museums and libraries, for example-and in
public accommodations, such as restaurants, bars, and cafes,
have little if any incentive to over-regulate patrons' expression
to avoid the risk of liability. No rational business or organization
that devotes itself to public discourse or that provides a place for
people to socialize would censor its patrons' speech, because it
would defeat the organization's reason for existence.
Let's begin with expressive workplaces. Many organizations
maximize something other than profit. A successful museum, for
example, attracts a lot of patrons and expands its donor base so
that it can expand its collection and stage larger and more elaborate exhibits (which in turn attracts more patrons and more donations). A museum will only succeed if it caters to its patrons
by making the museum a fun and exciting place for them to
learn and talk about art, history, or science. Actively policing patrons' expression or staging only the most inoffensive exhibits
vitiates these goals.
Much the same can be said about libraries. A good library
has lots of patrons as well as lots of books. Libraries attract patrons by providing materials on a wide range of topics and by
providing a pleasant place to think, read, and do research. Monitoring the materials that patrons use and read impedes those
purposes. Significantly, Title VII liability was not enough to
make the Minneapolis Library monitor and restrict patrons'
Internet access, though librarians did claim harassment. The library brushed off the librarians' complaints because of its institutional commitment to free access to information. The Minneapolis Library's stance is not unusual: the American Library
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Association has consistently fought governmental restrictions on
patrons' free access to information, most recently, federal requirements that libraries install Internet filters as a condition of
government funding. 253 Expressive workplaces that are profitmaximizing-art galleries or commercial movie theaters, for example-have similar incentives. Their ability to turn a profit depends on the expression they sell, and they are unlikely to
change that expression because an employee might find it offensive.
Public accommodations like bars and restaurants may not
have the same institutional commitment to public discourse that
expressive workplaces do. But they still have little economic
incentive to overreact to the risk of harassment liability by
policing the politeness of patrons' banter. People go to
restaurants, bars, and cafes rather than ordering take out or
having a glass of wine or cup of coffee at home because
restaurants, bars, and cafes are fun places to hang out, talk with
your friends, and people watch. It is hard to imagine that a
restaurant would give a customer the boot because a waitress
was offended by a conversation she overheard, unless perhaps,
the waitress overheard a customer make an extremely crude
remark about her. Hooters, to take an extreme example,
strenuously defended its policy of hiring only women for its
"front of the restaurant" positions against a class-action, sex
discrimination suit. Hooters thought that male wait staff would
have destroyed its restaurants' "t and a" atmosphere. 254 Hooters
refused to back down, and it settled the suit only after the
plaintiffs agreed that being a woman was a bona fide
253. See, e.g., Am. Library Ass'n, Inc. v. United Srates, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9537
(E.D. Pa. May 31, 2002) (striking on First Amendment grounds the Children's Internet
Protection Act requirement that federally funded public libraries use Internet filters that
exclude access to pornographic web sites). The American Library Association also
fought the Communications Decency Act of 1996, which had sought to limit minors' access to "indecent" materials on the Internet. See Am. Civil Libenies Union v. Reno, 929
F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (striking Act as a violation of the
First Amendment).
254. See Martha Carr, Hooters Girls serve up lawsuits; Tavern accused of pregnancy
bias, Times Picayune Sec. MONEY at 1 (October 22, 2000) ("Atlanta-based Hooters of
America paid $3.75 million to settle a sexual discrimination case that claimed men were
denied jobs as waiters. Hooters' defense was that the primary function of its waitresses
was not food service but 'providing vicarious sexual recreation.' In exchange for the pay·
ment, Hooters was granted by court order a Bonafide Occupational Qualification that
allows the company to hire only female waitresses"); Area Hooters franchisee sued; Har·
assment allegations isolated, firm says of ex-waitresses' case among Hooters' past legal
troubles, Dallas Morning News 2F (Mar. 31, 2001) (reporting that Hooters "has made a
niche for itself using scantily clad 'Hooters Girls' to serve chicken wings and burgers to
its mostly male customers. The chain features a girl of the week on its Web site and unabashedly declares, 'Sex appeal is legal and it sells.'").
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fide occupational qualification for waiting on customers at
Hooters. If a class-action BFOQ suit did not faze Hooters, an
individual hostile work environment suit is unlikely to.
Though Hooters might be an extreme example, it illustrates
my general point. Customers are restaurants' bread and butter, if
you will. Public accommodations that serve the public by providing a place to talk and relax are unlikely to react out of proportion to the risk of potential harassment liability.
It is true that employers in ordinary workplaces are more
likely to over-react to the threat of hostile work environment liability. But even here, the chill argument is overblown. Ordinary
workplaces can be sufficiently invested in old, comfortable ways
that they resist and resent having to change a workplace environment. Even after Robinson and Harris, some formerly allmale workplaces have balked at taking down girlie-posters and
stopping sexual horseplay. 255 Moreover, the connection between
workplace expression and public discourse is far more tenuous
in ordinary workplaces, and so the damage done by overzealous
employers is slight.
E. CONCLUSION

Legal uncertainty does not itself unconstitutionally inhibit
speech. A certain level of uncertainty is a fact of life for all participants in public discourse. Employers do face some legal uncertainty with regard to liability for workplace harassment
(though courts have offered more guidance on this point than
critics realize or admit). Not all employers will react identically
to the threat of liability. Employers have varying incentives to
promote or restrict expression depending on the workplace's
mission and values. Furthermore, hostile work environment's
doctrinal vagueness is comparable to the vagueness that accompanies the doctrines underlying dignitary torts and their relationship to the First Amendment.
In ordinary workplaces, the negligence standard for employer liability for hostile work environments created by coworkers and for environmental harassment strikes an appropri255. See, e.g., O'Rourke v. City of Providence, 235 F.3d 713 (1st Cir. 2001) (finding a
hostile work environment in a fire department where firefighters posted pornography
and viewed pornographic films in violation of fire department policy but with the tacit
approval of department superiors, and in the face of complaints by a woman firefighter);
Petrosky v. N.Y. State DMV, 72 F. Supp. 2d 39,45 (N.D. N.Y. 1999) (noting that when
plaintiff was hired, supervisor reportedly told her she would just have to tolerate her coworkers' foul language).
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ate balance between workplace expression and the important
government interest in ensuring equal employment opportunities. There is a more substantial risk within communicative
workplaces that environmental harassment suits claiming harassment due to an organization's or its patrons' expression could
squelch a great deal of public discourse. In environmental harassment cases arising in this context, courts should scrutinize
whether the expression at issue touches on matters of public
concern and is related to the organization's expressive mission.
If the answer to these questions is yes, Falwell protects employers from liability.
III. ABANDONING THE QUIXOTIC QUEST FOR
BRIGHT LINES
No bright-line rule dictates what is and what is not protected speech in the workplace, and the validity of First
Amendment objections to hostile work environment claims depends wholly on workplace context. Workplaces have varying
missions. That fact affects how workers encounter expression
within the workplace, which in turn affects whether such expression merits First Amendment protection. In other First Amendment areas, the Supreme Court has closely examined context
and the speakers' and recipients' orientation toward speech.
Courts reviewing hostile work environment causes of action
should do the same.
"Communicative" workplaces, which are organized around
producing or supporting expression that is part of public discourse, must be distinguished from workplaces that provide services or manufacture products outside the First Amendment's
ambit. In communicative workplaces, expression that relates to
the communicative mission of that workplace will often merit
First Amendment protection from hostile work environment
suits.
Some expression in "communicative" workplaces should be
treated differently under the First Amendment than expression
in "ordinary" workplaces. A museum deserves First Amendment protection against hostile work environment suits claiming
that the museum's exhibits constitute harassment or that patrons' speech about the exhibits constitute "environmental" harassment. Similarly, a writer for Hustler should not be able to
claim that Hustler's content or discussions about the magazine's
editorial decisions are harassing. A contrary rule would constrict
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important arenas for public discourse. On the other hand, a hostile work environment claim based on harassment by coworkers
that is unrelated to the communicative mission of the workplace
poses few First Amendment worries. Similarly, harassment
claims in ordinary workplaces that arise out of direct communications among supervisors and subordinates pose few if any First
Amendment problems. The same is true for harassment claims
based on direct interactions among coworkers in ordinary workplaces.
Critics' attacks on hostile work environment harassment
have been premised on an overly simplistic view of when, why,
and how the First Amendment protects expression. Ali-ornothing assertions about the protected or unprotected status of
workplace speech will not produce useful doctrine. A successful
defense of the hostile work environment cause of action must
avoid the same pitfalls. Both sides must abandon quixotic aspirations for bright-line rules in this area of law.
Abandoning the search for bright-line rules does not itself
imperil free speech. Rumors that the hostile work environment
cause of action and other contextual inquiries unconstitutionally
chill workplace speech are greatly exaggerated. Critics overstate
the risk that employers will react to the threat of liability for hostile work environment by restricting speech. Workplaces do not
have identical incentives to limit speech; communicative workplaces have little incentive to undermine their very mission of
generating expression. Moreover, the standards for hostile work
environment liability- both the "reasonable" person standard
for determining whether harassment exists and the standards for
employer liability-mirror those of dignitary torts. These standards are completely consistent with New York Times and subsequent cases.
Abandoning the quest for bright-line rules permits scrutiny
of the actual speech issues involved in harassment cases. Refusing to acknowledge that First Amendment protection depends
on culture and context, not bright-line rules, impoverishes our
understanding of the First Amendment and leaves us unprepared to meet the challenges of freedom of expression in our society.

